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John Smith1 worked as a scientist for a large pharmaceutical company in the 
suburbs north of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  In mid-March 2003, on his way 
home from work one evening, John stepped out of the commuter train station 
and into a nightmare.  As he walked to his car from the station, a robber hit 
him on the head with a cinderblock.  The assailant then robbed John, not only 
of his cash, but also of his soundness of mind. 
After the attack, John fell into a coma.  He awoke a few weeks later to a life 
he did not know.  His memory faded in and out.  He experienced debilitating 
fear and anxiety.  He could no longer function in his job.  He slowly recovered 
his physical strength, but he did not recover his full cognitive abilities.  
Unmarried and without any close family, John had no one to take full care of 
him.  Although friends aided him during the recovery, he did not have a 
permanent caretaker to provide the assistance he needed. 
Consequently, John failed to file his 2002 tax return, which came due while 
he was in the coma.  Likewise, he failed to file his 2003 return, which included 
a few months of salary and several months of sick leave and severance pay.  
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) eventually sent John letters notifying him 
of his failure to file the returns.  Like so much of the other correspondence 
John received, he did not know what to do with the letters and he did not 
respond.  The IRS eventually calculated John’s liability and sent him a notice 
of deficiency.  When he did file a petition with the Tax Court, the IRS assessed 
the proposed liabilities.  The IRS then sent John the customary collection 
notices, including the collection due process notice informing him of its intent 
to levy his assets if he did not address the unpaid taxes. 
Although his injuries prevented him from understanding and responding to 
the IRS notices, John did receive assistance in applying for Social Security 
disability and began receiving disability payments in 2005.  Because John had 
spent his entire savings on medical care after the robbery, he subsisted entirely 
on his disability payments.  His monthly disability check covered only his 
essential expenses: rent, food, and essential medical care.  The disability 
payments did not leave him with extra funds he could use to pay down his 
federal tax obligation. 
When John failed to pay his tax debt, the IRS began to levy fifteen percent 
of his disability payments each month.  The levy was a hardship for John 
because he could no longer afford all of his medication, food, or other 
necessities.  He eventually wrote to the IRS to attempt to explain his situation.  
                                                     
 1. John Smith is a fictional name and the facts stated here, although partially based on a 
real case, are a composite of facts and do represent the circumstances of a specific individual. 
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However, the IRS could not understand John’s letter, and because of his 
diminished capacity, John did not respond to any of the IRS’s requests for 
clarification. 
After the IRS levied John’s disability payments for almost three years, 
John’s friend brought him to the Villanova Tax Clinic to seek assistance in 
reducing or removing the levy.  The clinic contacted the IRS and requested that 
it stop the levy because it created an economic hardship for John.  Initially, the 
clinic received some resistance from the IRS because John had not filed 
returns.  However, the Tax Court had recently ruled that the failure to file 
returns did not override the statutory language concerning levies that created 
economic hardship.2  The clinic then considered whether it could reduce or 
eliminate the underlying liability, or at the very least obtain a refund of the 
already-levied funds.  Unfortunately, John had no records, no memory, and 
liabilities that were long outstanding.  Although the Internal Revenue Code 
(“IRC” or “Code”) authorizes the IRS to refund money it has collected in 
situations of economic hardship, the Code limits the refund to the amount of 
wrongfully-levied funds collected within the nine months before the taxpayer 
files a request for a return.3  Therefore, John could only recover twenty-five 
percent of the total amount levied from his disability payments.4 
The IRC contains a number of strict time limitations with which financially 
disabled taxpayers are often unable to comply. In 1998, Congress addressed 
financial disability within the Code by enacting IRC § 6511(h), creating a 
mechanism by which these financially disabled individuals could benefit from 
a suspension of the statute of limitations for filing claims for tax refunds.5   
Congress limited the relief granted in § 6511 to individuals seeking a tax 
refund.  However, the provision does not provide relief to financially disabled 
taxpayers like John, facing tight statutory time frames in a variety of situations 
other than just the claiming of a tax refund.6 
Although John’s story provides an extreme example of taxpayer disability, a 
large number of taxpayers face financial disabilities that have a great impact on 
their ability to comply with the strict limitations imposed by the Code.  This 
                                                     
 2. See Vinatieri v. Commissioner, 133 T.C. 392, 401–02 (2009) (concluding that levying 
the appellant’s wages because she failed to file her tax returns was “wrong as a matter of law” 
because I.R.C. § 6343 required the levy to be released if it created an economic hardship); see 
also I.R.C. § 6343(a)(1)(D) (2006) (requiring the release of a levy on property if the levy “is 
creating an economic hardship due to the financial condition of the taxpayer”). 
 3. See I.R.C. § 6343(b) (limiting the recovery of wrongfully-levied funds to the amount 
collected within nine months of the levy). 
 4. John could only recover nine out of the thirty-six months of disability payments levied, 
or twenty-five percent of the total amount.  See id. (allowing for the recovery of  
wrongfully–levied funds collected within nine months of the request). 
 5. See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.  
105-206, § 3202(a), 112 Stat. 685, 740 (codified at I.R.C. § 6511(h) (2006)). 
 6. See I.R.C. § 6511 (2006 & Supp. 2012) (placing limitations on requests for the refund of 
overpaid taxes). 
968 Catholic University Law Review  [Vol. 62:965 
Article argues that the concept of financial disability deserves broader 
application to allow those afflicted by financial disability to obtain an 
extension of the statutes of limitations under the IRC in circumstances beyond 
requests for tax refunds.  The Article first examines the definition of “financial 
disability” in light of fifteen years of judicial and administrative interpretation 
and proposes expanding the definition to encompass circumstances other than 
those allowed by the current statute.  Part I reviews United States v. Brockamp 
and Webb v. United States, two cases that led to the adoption of the IRC’s 
financial disability provision.  Part II examines the legislative history and 
scope of the IRC’s financial disability provision,  
§ 6511(h).  Part III explores three other provisions within the Code that also 
allow for the suspension of time limitations.  This Part also discusses 
additional circumstances that give rise to financial disability.  Finally, Part IV 
proposes a legislative solution that draws upon features of current statutes and 
IRS authority and outlines the suggested circumstances in which tolling should 
occur. 
I.  BACKGROUND OF THE IRC’S FINANCIAL DISABILITY RELIEF PROVISIONS 
The IRC’s financial disability relief provisions came into existence primarily 
in response to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. 
Brockamp.7  The request for relief in Brockamp occurred as a result of the 
Supreme Court opening the door to assertions of equitable tolling against the 
federal government in Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs.8 
The dispute in Irwin began after Shirley Irwin was fired from his job at the 
Department of Veterans Affairs.9  Irwin filed an unsuccessful complaint with 
the Veterans Administration, alleging that he was fired because of his race and 
an unspecified physical disability. 10   On appeal, the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) affirmed the Administration’s decision.11  
After the EEOC sent him a notice of its determination, Irwin had thirty days to 
file a complaint in the U.S. District Court.12  Irwin failed to timely file his 
                                                     
 7. 519 U.S. 347 (1997), superseded by statute, § 3202(a), 112 Stat. at 740. 
 8. 498 U.S. 89, 95–96 (1990).  This Article briefly discusses the equitable tolling of time 
frames in federal statutes.  See infra Part IV (suggesting the proper application of equitable tolling 
principles to the IRC’s time deadlines).  For a detailed discussion of this issue, see Carlton M. 
Smith, Cracks Appear in the Code’s ‘Jurisdictional’ Time Provisions, 137 TAX NOTES 511 
(2012) [hereinafter Smith, Cracks Appear in the Code’s ‘Jurisdictional’ Time Provisions]; 
Carlton M. Smith, Friedland: Did the Tax Court Blow Its Whistleblower Jurisdiction?, 131 TAX 
NOTES 843 (2011); Carlton M. Smith, Equitably Tolling Innocent Spouse and Collection Due 
Process Periods, 126 TAX NOTES 1106 (Mar. 1, 2010). 
 9. Irwin, 498 U.S. at 90. 
 10. Id. at 90–91. 
 11. Id. at 91. 
 12. Id. (noting that Irwin had the right to file an employment discrimination action under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act within thirty days after receiving the EEOC’s determination 
letter). 
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complaint, both because of his late receipt of the EEOC’s notice of 
determination and because his attorney was out of the country when notice 
finally arrived.13 
At the trial and intermediate appellate levels, the government succeeded in 
arguing that compliance with the statute of limitations was an absolute 
requirement for waiving sovereign immunity.14  Because Irwin failed to meet 
this condition, his complaint was barred for lack of jurisdiction.15  However, 
the Supreme Court, instead of deciding the case on this jurisdictional ground 
and noting the need for greater predictability in this area, granted certiorari “to 
adopt a more general rule to govern the applicability of equitable tolling in 
suits against the Government.”16  The Court reasoned that equitable tolling is 
ordinarily available in suits against private litigants, and therefore that “the 
same rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling that applies to suits against 
private defendants should also apply to suits against the United States.”17 
The Court created hope for litigants whose actions against the United States 
did not meet the statutory time frames and whose cases were subject to 
dismissal on jurisdictional grounds.  Even though the Supreme Court went out 
of its way in Irwin to announce a clarifying rule in a case that did not merit 
equitable tolling, the clarity the Court sought to bring with the ruling would not 
have as wide of an impact as anticipated.  The Court’s holding was undercut by 
a case decided earlier the same year, in which the Court held that it did not 
have jurisdiction to hear a tax refund claim filed outside of the statute of 
limitations.18  Drawing on this holding, the application of the Irwin rule to 
federal tax provisions was soon considered, challenged, and rejected. 
A.  Webb v. United States 
Three days before the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Brockamp, the Fourth 
Circuit decided a case that also considered the application of equitable tolling 
                                                     
 13. See id. (explaining that Irwin filed his complaint in the district court forty-four days 
after his attorney’s office allegedly received the EEOC’s letter, but only twenty-nine days after he 
claimed to have personally received the letter, which was nineteen days after the date on the 
letter). 
 14. Id. at 91–92 (“The [Fifth Circuit] held that the 30-day [statute of limitations] begins to 
run on the date that the EEOC right-to-sue letter is delivered to the offices of formally designated 
counsel or to the claimant, even if counsel himself did not actually receive notice until later.”). 
 15. Id. (commenting that this conclusion was in direct conflict with other federal courts of 
appeals). 
 16. Id. at 95. 
 17. See id. at 95–96 (specifying that equitable tolling applies to suits against private litigants 
as well as to private suits under Title VII).  Unfortunately for Mr. Irwin, the Court concluded that 
his circumstances did not merit equitable tolling.  Id. at 96. 
 18. See United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 608–10 (1990) (denying the appellant’s 
request for a refund on a gift tax because she filed her claim after the three-year statute of 
limitations had expired). 
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principles to tax cases.19  In Webb v. United States, the Fourth Circuit rejected 
the argument that § 6511 contained an implied exception permitting equitable 
tolling. 20   Webb involved Mary Morton Parsons, a member of a wealthy 
Richmond, Virginia family. 21   Mrs. Parsons lived a life sheltered from 
financial concerns and relied on her parents, then her husband, and then her 
sister-in-law to manage her financial affairs.22  When all of these individuals 
passed away, Mrs. Parsons turned to Dr. Alvin Q. Jarrett, her personal 
physician and social acquaintance, to manage her personal affairs.23  He soon 
proved that her trust was misplaced.24  Dr. Jarrett teamed with tax attorney 
Roland Freasier, Jr. to essentially take all of Mrs. Parsons’s money: 
Through systematic physical and emotional abuse during the ensuing 
fourteen years, Jarrett and Freasier induced Parsons to relinquish to 
them total control over her day-to-day affairs.  They persuaded her to 
move into virtual seclusion in Virginia Beach, Virginia, where they 
confined her to her bed under heavy sedation.  They discharged most 
of Parsons’ household staff and prevented her from receiving mail or 
telephone calls and from seeing visitors.  They also induced her to 
grant to each of them powers-of-attorney, thus enabling them to 
manipulate her financial affairs for their own benefit.25 
As they stole her money, Jarrett and Freasier filed a gift tax return reporting 
the transfers of funds from Mrs. Parsons to each of them, their spouses, and 
their children.26  Mrs. Parsons eventually discovered the fraudulent transfers, 
with the help of an old friend, and brought suit against Jarrett and Freasier in 
state court to recover the stolen money.27  Mrs. Parsons also filed a refund 
                                                     
 19. See Webb v. United States, 66 F.3d 691, 692 (4th Cir. 1995). 
 20. Id. at 701–02 (holding that Irwin’s presumption of equitable tolling does not apply to tax 
cases). 
 21. Id. at 692 (noting that Mrs. Parsons was the daughter of the founder of an insurance 
company and “enjoyed considerable wealth”). 
 22. Id. (explaining that Mrs. Parsons had “only a limited understanding of financial 
matters”). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id.; see Best Rip-Off Artists in Richmond History, STYLE WKLY., Apr. 27, 2011, at 65 
(naming Dr. Jarrett and his accomplice “The Philanthropist’s Jailers” and considering the duo 
among the “Best Rip-Off Artists in Richmond History”).  A series of articles that appeared in the 
Richmond Times-Dispatch provide the best recitation of the facts of Mrs. Parsons’s case.  See, 
e.g., Elliott Cooper, Physician Says Widow’s Suit Against Him Is Too Sweeping, RICH.  
TIMES-DISPATCH, Jan. 12, 1988, at B–5; Randolph Goode, Estate Files $16.8 Million Lawsuit 
Against U.S., RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Dec. 18, 1993, at B–1; Randolph Goode, Lawsuit Seeking 
Return of ‘80 Gift Taxes Dismissed, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, May 6, 1994, at B–6; Bill 
McKelway, A Quiet Man of Influence, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Sept. 20, 1998, at G–1; Service 
Scheduled Here for Mary Morton Parsons, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Aug. 28, 1990, at B–2. 
 25. Webb, 66 F.3d at 692. 
 26. Id. (noting that Jarrett and Freasier paid a total of $11,362,876.88 in gift taxes on these 
transfers). 
 27. Id. 
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claim with the IRS seeking the return of the gift taxes paid, arguing that no gift 
had occurred.28  Her suit against Jarrett and Freasier succeeded, but her suit 
against the IRS did not.29 
Under § 6511, a taxpayer must file a refund claim three years from the time 
the tax return was filed or two years from the time the tax was paid, whichever 
is later.30  The IRS accepted the basis for Mrs. Parsons’s refund claim and 
refunded the gift tax payments made within the two-year statutory time period 
before she filed the claim.31  However, the IRS denied her refund claim on gift 
taxes paid more than two years before the claim, reasoning that return of this 
balance was barred by the statute of limitations.32 
Mrs. Parsons’s estate brought suit, arguing that the circumstances of this 
case warranted the equitable tolling of the statute of limitations under Irwin.33  
The district court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.34  On appeal, the 
Fourth Circuit noted that “[i]f this case had arisen prior to 1990, there would 
seemingly be no question that the district court’s holding was correct.”35  
However, the Fourth Circuit engaged in a lengthy analysis of Irwin before 
affirming the district court’s decision.36  The court distinguished Irwin, finding 
that the Supreme Court premised its holding on the fact that the case involved 
an employment action under Title VII.37  Consequently, the court refused to 
toll the statute of limitations, both because tax refund suits have no private 
                                                     
 28. Id. at 692–93; see Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 6, Webb v. United States, 519 U.S. 
1148 (1997) (No. 95–1360) (explaining that the IRS refunded a portion of the gift taxes and 
interest paid because no gift had occurred). 
 29. See Webb, 66 F.3d at 692–93 (hearing the plaintiff’s appeal of the IRS’s refusal to 
refund the gift taxes paid more than two years before the filing of the refund claim). 
 30. I.R.C. § 6511(a) (2006) (requiring the taxpayer to file a claim for a refund “within 3 
years from the time the return was filed or 2 years from the time the tax was paid, whichever of 
such periods expires the later”). 
 31. Webb, 66 F.3d at 692–93 (explaining that the IRS refunded the gift tax and interest 
payments made within the time frame prescribed by § 6511(a)). 
 32. See Webb, 66 F.3d at 692–93 (noting that the IRS refused to refund the payments made 
in 1980, eight years before Mr. Parsons filed the claim, and acknowledging that she filed the 
claim outside of the statute of limitations). 
 33. Webb v. United States, 850 F. Supp. 489, 490–92 (E.D. Va. 1994) (citing Irwin v. Dep’t 
of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95–96 (1960)).  The plaintiffs argued that Irwin’s presumption 
extended to tax cases, and that equitable tolling was therefore available to Mrs. Parsons.  Id. at 
492. 
 34. Id. at 493. 
 35. Webb, 66 F.3d at 692, 694 (explaining that courts traditionally decline to toll statutes of 
limitations on equitable principles alone out of deference to Congress’s authority to determine the 
exact circumstances in which the government will waive its sovereign immunity). 
 36. Id. at 695–702 (rejecting the application of Irwin’s rebuttable presumption to tax cases). 
 37. Id. at 696–97.  The Irwin court concluded that, because equitable tolling is available 
under Title VII for actions against private employers, the same statutory time limits and 
exceptions are available in suits against the United States.  498 U.S. at 95.  The Fourth Circuit 
found the Title VII similarity “[c]rucial to the Supreme Court’s holding.”  Webb, 66 F.3d at 696. 
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remedy comparable to Title VII actions, and because the tax refund statute 
clearly identifies the staute of limitations as a jurisdictional bar.38 
Drawing on the sympathetic nature in the case and the disagreement among 
the circuits in the application of Irwin, Mrs. Parsons’s estate appealed to the 
Supreme Court. 39   However, the Court declined the opportunity to clarify 
Irwin’s reach and extend equitable tolling principles to § 6511, and denied 
certiorari.40  In reality, the Fourth Circuit’s holding was consistent with the 
circuit courts that had considered the issue and found that § 6511 did not 
authorize equitable tolling.41 
B.  Brockamp v. United States 
Driven by the same language in Irwin that inspired Webb, two other cases 
made their way to the Ninth Circuit at precisely the same time.42  Brockamp v. 
United States and Scott v. United States, were decided by the Ninth Circuit on 
                                                     
 38. Id. at 697–702.  In Oropallo v. United States, 994 F.2d 25, 31 (1st Cir. 1993)  
(per curiam), the court found that the statutory structure of the IRC is inconsistent with the 
concept of equitable tolling.  The Oropallo court reasoned that Section § 6511 has two “time 
barriers”: (1) the claim must be made within three years of the filing of the return, and (2) the 
requested relief must fall within the “outside limit” on recovery, three years before the filing of 
the claim.  994 F.2d at 30–31.  As a result of this structure, the claimant has adequate time to file 
a claim and is aware of the extent of allowable recovery.  Id. (relying on Lampf v. Gilbertson, 501 
U.S. 350, 363–64 (1991) (using the same rationale in the context of similarly-structured securities 
regulations), superseded by statute, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, § 476, 105 Stat. 2387 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1(a) (2006))). 
 39. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 28, at 13, 26–27.  The petitioners first 
pointed to a perceived circuit split, arguing that both the result of cases heard in the First, Fourth, 
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits and the rationale underlying the holdings differed greatly.  Id. at  
13–16.  The petitioners also cited fairness and administrative issues, noting that the failure to 
recognize equitable tolling in tax cases resulted in the “wrongful retention” of tax funds.  Id. at 
26–27. 
 40. Webb v. United States, 519 U.S. 1148, 1148 (1997). 
 41. See, e.g., Amoco Prod. Co. v. Newton Sheep Co., 85 F.3d 1464, 1471–72  
(10th Cir. 1996) (holding that the plaintiffs could have—and should have, based on their 
knowledge—filed a protective claim for a refund in anticipation of the potential for a future 
claim); Lovett v. United States, 81 F.3d 143, 145–46 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that claims of 
equity cannot override congressional intent concerning statutes of limitations); Oropallo, 994 
F.2d at 28–31 (finding that the structure of § 6511 is inconsistent with equitable tolling); Vintilla 
v. United States, 931 F.2d 1444, 1446–47 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (concluding that the 
statute of limitations bar is jurisdictional because it is a condition of the United States’ waiver of 
its sovereign immunity). 
 42. Brockamp v. United States, 859 F. Supp. 1283, 1287–88 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (considering 
the application of the Irwin presumption of equitable tolling to tax cases), rev’d, 67 F.3d 260 (9th 
Cir. 1995), rev’d, 519 U.S. 347 (1997), superseded by statute, Internal Revenue Service 
Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 3202(a), 112 Stat. 685, 740–41 
(codified at I.R.C. § 6511(h) (2006)); Scott v. United States, 847 F. Supp. 1499, 1506–07  
(D. Haw. 1995) (same), aff’d, Nos. 94-15321, 94-15323, 1995 WL 653979, at *1–2 (9th Cir. Oct. 
5, 1995) (citing Brockamp, 67 F.3d 260 (allowing for equitable tolling in tax cases)). 
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the same day.43  While the Brockamp case has received more attention,44 Scott 
also deserves mention. 
Nicholas Scott, a former California lawyer, faced severe personal and 
financial consequences from alcoholism.45   For the tax year 1984, Scott’s 
father, acting under power of attorney, deposited over $30,000 in anticipated 
tax liability with the IRS on Mr. Scott’s behalf.46  However, Mr. Scott’s father 
terminated the power of attorney before filing Mr. Scott’s 1984 tax return.47  
Mr. Scott eventually filed the 1984 return in November of 1989, long after the 
period for claiming a refund had expired.  The return sought a refund of the 
full amount of estimated payments to the IRS in 1984.48  The IRS denied the 
claim because Scott filed it well outside of the statute of limitations prescribed 
by § 6511.49  Scott filed suit in district court, which concluded that Scott’s 
alcoholism rendered him mentally incompetent from the due date for the 1984 
                                                     
 43. Brockamp, 67 F.3d at 260 (hearing argument on June 5, 1995 and issuing an opinion on 
October 5, 1995); Scott, 1995 WL 653979, at *1 (same). 
 44. The Ninth Circuit devoted a full opinion to Brockamp, 67 F.3d at 260–61, but simply 
affirmed the district court without a reported opinion in Scott, 1995 WL 653979, at *1–2. 
 45. Scott, 847 F. Supp. at 1501–02.  Plaintiff Nicholas Scott was suspended from the 
California bar and eventually lost his job as an attorney because of his heavy drinking.  Id. at 
1500–01.  From 1980 to 1985, Mr. Scott was incapacitated to the point that his father held power 
of attorney for him.  Id. at 1501.  Mr. Scott faced additional professional consequences of his 
alcoholism, such as losing his wine store, and personal consequences, such as failed relationships 
and DUI violations.  Id. at 1501–02. 
 46. Id. at 1500.  Mr. Scott’s father, Gene Scott, demanded power of attorney when he 
discovered that his son had failed to pay income taxes for several years.  Id.  Gene Scott oversaw 
Mr. Scott’s tax liability, paying a total of $30,096.00 to the IRS on Mr. Scott’s behalf during the 
1984 tax year.  Id. 
 47. See id.  Gene Scott tore up his power of attorney at some time during the period between 
December of 1984 and January of 1985, several months before Mr. Scott’s tax return was due.  
Id.  Although Gene Scott did not facilitate the filing of the 1984 return, he did ensure that Mr. 
Scott made the final estimated tax payment for the year, due in January of 1985. Id.  Mr. Scott 
made this payment on time, but did not file his 1984 return by the due date, April 15, 1985.  Id. 
 48. Id. at 1500.  Because he had no tax liability in 1984, Mr. Scott sought a refund of the 
$30,096.00—plus interest—he paid to the IRS throughout that year.  Id. 
 49. Id. at 1500–01 (explaining the procedural history of Mr. Scott’s case before reaching the 
district court); I.R.C. § 6511(a) (prescribing a three-year statute of limitations for the filing of 
refund claims with the IRS).  Mr. Scott filed his refund claim over four years after the due date, 
over a year outside of the statute of limitations.  See Scott, 847 F. Supp. at 1500–01. 
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return to the filing of the late return in 1989.50  The court thus held that the 
statute of limitations was equitably tolled.51  The Ninth Circuit agreed.52 
In Brockamp, Marian Brockamp was appointed to administer the estate of 
her father, Stanley B. McGill.53  In 1984, Mr. McGill, a brilliant mathematician 
during his working years, sent a check for $7,000 to the IRS in anticipation of 
his 1983 tax liability, along with a request for an extension to file his 1983 
return.54  However, Mr. McGill never filed a return for that year.55  At the time 
of filing the request for extension, Mr. McGill was ninety-three years old and 
suffering from some symptoms of dementia.56  While settling his estate, Ms. 
Brockamp realized that her father had not filed a tax return for 1983.57  She 
prepared and filed the 1983 return, which showed a liability of only $427.58  
When the IRS refused to refund the balance, citing the three-year statute of 
limitations, she brought suit.59  The district court dismissed the suit for lack of 
                                                     
 50. Scott, 847 F. Supp. at 1503–04.  The court heard expert witness testimony from two 
doctors, both of whom agreed that alcohol use can result in mental incompetence if used in a 
sufficient amount and over a sufficient period of time.  Id. at 1503.  The court concluded that Mr. 
Scott, as a result of his alcoholism, was mentally incompetent from January 1995 through 
September 1987, and from September 1988 through November 1989.  Id.  Consequently, as a 
matter of law, Mr. Scott did not have the mental competency to file a tax return before November 
1989.  Id. at 1503–04. 
 51. Id. at 1506–08.  The court found that the Irwin presumption that equitable tolling is 
available in an action against the United States is applicable to tax cases, and that the government 
failed to rebut the presumption.  Id. at 1506 (citing Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 
89, 95–96 (1990)).  The court used the rationale in Irwin to hold that a statute of limitations may 
be equitably tolled because of mental incompetence, and consequently found that Mr. Scott’s 
alcoholism tolled the statute of limitations on his tax refund claim.  Id. at 1506–08. 
 52. Scott v. United States, Nos. 94-15321, 94-15323, 1995 WL 653979, at *1–2 (9th Cir. 
Oct. 5, 1995) (relying on Brockamp v. United States, 67 F.3d 260 (9th Cir. 1995), rev’d, 519 U.S. 
347 (1997), superseded by statute, Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 3202(a), 112 Stat. 685, 740–41 (codified at I.R.C. § 6511(h)). 
 53. Brockamp v. United States, 859 F. Supp. 1283, 1285 (C.D. Cal. 1994), rev’d, 67 F.3d 
260.  Ms. Brockamp was the administrator and sole beneficiary of Mr. McGill’s estate.  Id. 
 54. Id. at 1284.  Mr. McGill did not indicate the purpose for the payment, but simply sent a 
$7,000 check accompanying his Form 4868 extension request.  Id. 
 55. Id.  Because Mr. McGill requested a time extension for his return but never filed it, the 
IRS sent two delinquency notes, on December 15, 1984 and February 18, 1985.  Id. at 1284 & 
n.2. 
 56. Id. at 1284.  Ms. Brockamp described Mr. McGill as “mentally deranged” and “senile.”  
Id. at 1284 & n.1. 
 57. See id. at 1284–85 (explaining that Mr. McGill failed to file a return for the 1983 tax 
year and that Ms. Brockamp filed this return in 1991, only after assuming control of the estate). 
 58. Id. at 1285.  Mrs. Brockamp requested a refund of the remaining balance because, due to 
his mental incapacities, Mr. McGill mistakenly sent a check for $7,000 rather than $700.  Id. 
 59. Id.  Ms. Brockamp first argued that, as a “deposit as a matter of law,” the balance should 
be returned to the estate.  Id.  In the alternative, she claimed that the statute of limitations should 
be equitably tolled based on Mr. McGill’s mental incapacity.  Id. at 1287. 
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jurisdiction due to the late filing of the return as a refund claim. 60   Ms. 
Brockamp appealed, and the Ninth Circuit, relying on Irwin, found that 
equitable tolling applied because of McGill’s mental condition at the time the 
statute of limitations passed.61 
The government appealed to the Supreme Court in both Brockamp and 
Scott.62  The Court consolidated the cases and granted certiorari.63  The Court 
acknowledged that some language in Irwin could support equitable tolling in 
tax refund cases, but determined that it could “travel no further, however, 
along Irwin’s road, for there are strong reasons for answering Irwin’s question 
in the Government’s favor.”64  The Court noted that “[§] 6511 sets forth its 
time limitations in unusually emphatic form.”65  It determined that the “highly 
detailed” and technical structure of the statute did not indicate an implicit 
exception for equitable tolling.66  The Court noted that tax law generally does 
not provide relief in the form of case-specific exceptions because of the high 
volume of returns the IRS must process. 67   However, the Court did not 
explicitly rule out the possibility that equitable tolling could apply to tax 
provisions, nor did the Court limit the rule prohibiting equitable tolling of tax 
statutes to situations involving high-volume IRS activities, like requests for 
refunds.68  With these issues still unsettled, taxpayers with other tax issues can 
still hold out hope that equitable tolling may be available in their cases.69 
                                                     
 60. See id. at 1284–86, 1289 (explaining that a court does not have jurisdiction over tax 
claims filed outside of the statute of limitations and dismissing Ms. Brockamp’s claim because it 
was filed outside of the limitations period, which could not be equitably tolled). 
 61. Brockamp v. United States, 67 F.3d 260, 262–63 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Irwin v. Dep’t 
of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95–96 (1990)) (reasoning that the presumption that equitable 
tolling applies to suits against the United States coupled with the fact that Congress took no 
action to prevent equitable tolling even after Irwin compelled equitable tolling in favor of the 
plaintiff), rev’d, 519 U.S. 347 (1997), superseded by statute, Internal Revenue Service 
Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 3202(a), 112 Stat. 685, 740–41 
(codified at I.R.C. § 6511(h)). 
 62. Brockamp v. United States, 517 U.S. 1232, 1232–33 (1996). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Brockamp, 519 U.S. at 350 (finding that the similarity between private suits and actions 
against the government was sufficient to advance the inquiry to congressional intent concerning 
equitable tolling). 
 65. Id.  (finding the statute of limitations clear and without implicit exceptions, 
representative of the congressional intent to exclude equitable tolling). 
 66. Id. at 350–52 (analyzing the language and structure of § 6511(h)). 
 67. Id. at 352 (predicting that reading an “‘equitable tolling’ exception into § 6511 could 
create serious administrative problems by forcing the IRS to respond to, and perhaps litigate, 
large numbers of late claims”). 
 68. See id. at 352–53. 
 69. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Sebelius, 642 F.3d 1145 (D.C. Cir. 2011), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 
817 (2013), was poised to clarify the ability to extend Irwin’s equitable tolling principles and 
provided the opportunity for the Supreme Court to reconsider or overturn its holding in 
Brockamp.  Auburn involved a hospital’s late claim for Medicare reimbursement, which was the 
result of the incorrect calculation of the amount to be refunded.  Id. at 1147.  The D.C. Circuit 
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II.  IRC § 6511(h) 
A.  Legislative History of § 6511(h) 
Brockamp revealed the Code’s harshness in matters in which a statutory time 
frame exists.70  Both Congress and the Clinton Administration recognized that 
the Ninth Circuit’s holding yielded inequitable results.71  The decision led 
President Clinton to urge the Department of the Treasury to revise the IRC so 
that the decision to extend equitable relief in such situations would no longer 
be left up to the courts.72 
The House of Representatives responded similarly to the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision in Brockamp.  In a bipartisan effort, Democratic Representative 
Robert T. Matsui of California and Republican Representative Jennifer B. 
Dunn of Washington sought to amend § 6511 to allow for equitable tolling of 
the statute under certain circumstances.73  In her remarks on the House floor, 
Representative Dunn highlighted the “outrageous injustice” created by 
Brockamp, which she argued could be corrected with a “commonsense change 
of law.” 74   To remedy the problem, the representatives moved to add an 
equitable tolling provision to the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2.75  The proposed 
amendment, which allowed for the suspension of § 6511’s statute of 
limitations, stated: 
for the period during which it is established to the satisfaction of the 
Secretary [of the Treasury] that—(1) the taxpayer is incompetent (as 
                                                                                                                          
applied equitable tolling principles to the hospital’s claim, distinguishing the case from Brockamp 
by pointing to the Court’s discussion of § 6511’s language and structure.  Id. at 1149–50.  
However, the Court declined to equitably toll the statute of limitations, citing Brockamp to 
support the principle that the Court “h[ad] never applied the Irwin presumption to an agency’s 
internal appeal deadline.”  Auburn, 133 S. Ct. at 827. 
 70. See David G. Savage, Woman Wins Victory—But No Refund—In IRS Battle, L.A. 
TIMES, Feb. 14, 1997, at B1 (arguing that Brockamp’s “strict enforcement of the rules, rather than 
a sense of fairness, reigns in the area of tax law”). 
 71. See Andrea Sharetta, Note, The Problem of Equitable Tolling in Tax Refund Claims, 72 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 545, 588 (1997) (“Both the legislative and executive branches have 
recognized that a legislative fix is in order.”). 
 72. Id.; see also Michael S. Moriarty, Government Asks Supreme Court to Overturn 
Equitable Tolling Cases, 96 TAX NOTES TODAY 23-2 (Feb. 2, 1996), available at LEXIS, 96 TNT 
23-2, Doc. No. 96-3456 (noting that, because of the sympathetic nature of the cases, “the Clinton 
[A]dministration has publicly encouraged Treasury to work on a possible legislative fix”).   
Then-Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin commented that he and President Clinton believed that the 
tax system should be “responsive to the personal hardships faced by incapacitated taxpayers.”  
Treasury Proposes Extending Time Limit for Refund Claims for Incapacitated Taxpayers, 70 TAX 
NOTES 1425, 1743 (Donna Edwards ed., 1996). 
 73. See 142 CONG. REC. 7639 (1996) (statement of Rep. Dunn). 
 74. Id. (explaining that the legislation was designed to aid taxpayers who made an “honest 
mistake”). 
 75. Id.  The Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2 was enacted “to provide for increased taxpayer 
protections.”  Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, 110 Stat. 1452 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of I.R.C.). 
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determined by a court), (2) the taxpayer is committed to a mental 
institution or hospital, or (3) to the extent provided in regulations, the 
taxpayer suffers from any debilitating physical or mental condition 
which prevents the taxpayer from managing the taxpayer’s financial 
affairs.76 
Despite the representatives’ efforts, the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2 went into 
effect without this provision.77 
The following year the Supreme Court reached its conclusion in Brockamp, 
making clear that the injustice Repreesntatives Dunn and Matsui tried to fix in 
1996 had come to pass.78  As part of the Restructuring and Reform Act of 
1998, Congress added a provision to the refund statute authorizing a 
suspension of the statute of limitations for “financially disabled” taxpayers.79  
For a taxpayer to qualify as “financially disabled,” the amended § 6511(h) 
“requires that (1) the taxpayer have a physical or mental impairment; (2) the 
impairment be medically determinable; and (3) the impairment bear a causal 
relationship to the taxpayer’s inability to manage financial affairs.” 80  
However, a taxpayer who meets these conditions will still not qualify as 
“financially disabled” if an authorized individual acts on his behalf in financial 
matters. 81   Each of the listed requirements to establish financial disability 
limits the overall benefit Congress sought to confer and may create limitations 
greater than intended. 
Although the legislative history of § 6511(h) does not specifically identify 
the origin of the financial disability requirement, it is evident that Congress 
drew on statutory language from elsewhere in the Code.82  For example, § 22, 
                                                     
 76. Dunn’s Equitable Tolling Amendment to Section 6511, 97 TAX NOTES TODAY 25-22 
(Feb. 6, 1997), available at LEXIS, 97 TNT 25-22, Doc. No. 97-3678. 
 77. See generally 110 Stat. 1452 (containing no provision for equitable tolling). 
 78. Brockamp v. United States, 519 U.S. 347 (1997), superseded by statute, Internal 
Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 3202(a), 112 
Stat. 685, 740–41 (codified at I.R.C. § 6511(h)). 
 79. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, 
§ 3202(a), 112 Stat. 685, 740–41 (codified at I.R.C. § 6511(h) (2006)) (suspending the statute of 
limitations in § 6511 “during any period of [an] individual’s life that such individual is financially 
disabled”). 
 80. Bruce A. McGovern, The New Provision for Tolling the Limitations Periods for Seeking 
Tax Refunds: Its History, Operation and Policy, and Suggestions for Reform, 65 MO. L. REV. 
797, 855 (2000).  Section 6511(h) considers a taxpayer “financially disabled” if he “is unable to 
manage his financial affairs by reason of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment 
of the individual which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected 
to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.”  I.R.C. § 6511(h)(2)(A). 
 81. I.R.C. § 6511(h)(2)(B) (“An individual shall not be treated as financially disabled during 
any period that such individual’s spouse or any other person is authorized to act on behalf of such 
individual in financial matters.”). 
 82. McGovern, supra note 80, at 850 & n.286 (citing S. REP. NO. 105-174, at 145 (1998); 
H.R. REP. NO. 105-599, at 146–47 (1998) (Conf. Rep.)); H.R. REP. NO. 105-364, pt. 1, at 62–63 
(1997) (noting that the legislative history fails to define “financial disability”). 
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which provides a credit for the elderly and permanently disabled, defines 
“permanent and total disability” as “any medically determinable physical or 
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted 
or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than  
[twelve] months.” 83   The language first appeared in the Social Security 
Amendments of 1956 as the threshold for receiving Social Security Disability 
Insurance benefits.84 
Section 6511(h)’s definition of “financial disability” significantly limits the 
circumstances in which this provision applies.  Section 6511(h)’s requirement 
that the taxpayer suffer from a “medically determinable” impairment may 
define the circumstances necessary to establish financial disability too 
narrowly, precluding relief in equally compelling cases.85  By linking financial 
disability to physical and mental impairment, the statute fails to address other 
circumstances that raise significant fairness issues.  It is unclear why Congress 
chose to define “financially disabled” so narrowly.86 
                                                     
 83. I.R.C. § 22(e)(5) (2006); see also McGovern, supra note 80, at 850 & n.287 (discussing 
the provisions of the IRC from which § 6511(h) borrowed). 
 84. McGovern, supra note 80, at 850 & n.289. 
 85. The cases that led to § 6511(h) involved a physical or mental condition that impaired the 
taxpayer and prevented him from filing a timely refund claim.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 348 (1997) (dementia), superseded by statute, Internal Revenue Service 
Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 3202(a), 112 Stat. 685, 740–41 
(codified at I.R.C. § 6511(h)); Webb v. United States, 66 F.3d 691, 692 (4th Cir. 1995) (heavy 
sedation); Scott v. United States, 70 F.3d 120, No. 94-15321, 1995 WL 653979, at *1 (9th Cir. 
Oct. 5, 1995) (alcoholism), rev’d, Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347(1997).  However, other cases that 
have considered the equitable tolling of § 6511’s statute of limitations have raised additional 
important concerns.  See, e.g., Amoco Prod. Co. v. Newton Sheep Co., 85 F.3d 1464, 1471 (10th 
Cir. 1996) (rejecting Newton Sheep Company’s argument that the statute of limitations for filing 
windfall tax refund claims should be equitably tolled because the company’s customers withheld 
windfall profit taxes on its behalf and it was unaware of the exact amount of the royalties to 
which it would be entitled); Lovett v. United States, 81 F.3d 143, 144–46 (Fed. Cir. 1996) 
(rejecting the taxpayer’s request for equitable tolling because he received incorrect advice from 
the Veteran’s Administration); Oropallo v. United States, 994 F.2d 25, 28 (1st Cir. 1993) (per 
curiam) (rejecting the taxpayer’s request for equitable tolling because he suffered from carbon 
monoxide poisoning); Vintilla v. United States, 931 F.2d 1444, 1446 (11th Cir. 1991) (per 
curiam) (rejecting the taxpayers’ argument that equitable tolling should apply because  
similarly-situated taxpayers had been treated differently and were not required to pay taxes in the 
same manner). 
 86. Congress authorized the IRS to award equitable relief in certain situations by providing 
for equitable relief with the new effective tax administration offer-in-compromise provisions.   
Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 3462, 
112 Stat. 685 at 764–67.  It also added equitable relief for innocent spouse claimants with the 
creation of new I.R.C. § 6015(f).  Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 
1998 § 3201(a), 112 Stat. at 734 (codified at I.R.C. § 6015 (2006)). 
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B.  IRS Guidance on § 6511(h) 
Section 6511(h) grants the Secretary of the Treasury the authority to require 
proof of a taxpayer’s financial disability.87  In April of 1999, the IRS issued 
Revenue Procedure 99-21,88 which “sets forth in detail the ‘form and manner’ 
in which proof of financial disability must be provided.”89   According to 
Revenue Procedure 99-21, a taxpayer must submit two very specific pieces of 
documentation to prove financial disability.  First, the taxpayer must submit a 
physician’s written statement that sets forth: 
(a) the name and a description of the taxpayer’s physical or mental 
impairment; 
(b) the physician’s medical opinion that the physical or mental 
impairment prevented the taxpayer from managing the taxpayer’s 
financial affairs; 
(c) the physician’s medical opinion that the physical or mental 
impairment was or can be expected to result in death, or that it has 
lasted (or can be expected to last) for a continuous period of not less 
than 12 months; 
(d) to the best of the physician’s knowledge, the specific time period 
during which the taxpayer was prevented by such physical or mental 
impairment from managing the taxpayer’s financial affairs; and 
(e) the following certification, signed by the physician: 
I hereby certify that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, the 
above representations are true, correct, and complete.90 
Second, a taxpayer must submit a statement certifying that no other 
individual had the authority to act on taxpayer’s behalf regarding financial 
matters during the taxpayer’s period of financial disability.91  Any time period 
during which an individual was authorized to act for the taxpayer must be 
included in the calculation of the limitations period.92 
                                                     
 87. I.R.C. § 6511(h)(2)(A) (requiring proof of financial disability “in such form and manner 
as the Secretary may require”). 
 88. Rev. Proc. 99-21, 1999-1 C.B. 960.  In Abston v. Commissioner of the IRS, 691 F.3d 
992, 996 (8th Cir. 2012), the taxpayer challenged the validity of Revenue Procedure 99-21, 
arguing that it should not control in tax refund cases because it is not a formal IRS rule.  The 
court rejected this argument, holding that the Revenue Procedure is sufficient to provide guidance 
in applying § 6511.  Id. 
 89. Bova v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 449, 455 (2008). 
 90. Rev. Proc. 99-21, 1999-1 C.B. 960.  The term “physician” is defined in 42 U.S.C.  
§1395x(r) (2006). 
 91. Rev. Proc. 99-21, 1999-1 C.B. 960. 
 92. See Michael I. Saltzman, IRS Practice and Procedure ¶ 11.05[2][b] (rev. 2d ed. 2012). 
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C.  Judicial Interpretation and Application of § 6511(h) 
1. Judicial Refusal to Equitably Toll § 6511 
In considering refund claims brought under § 6511, courts have generally 
applied the Brockamp rationale to reject requests to equitably toll the statute of 
limitations, particularly in situations involving circumstances that fall clearly 
outside of the scope of § 6511(h), or in situations in which taxpayers fail to 
properly substantiate their assertions of financial disability.  For example, the 
First Circuit in Dickow v. United States declined to equitably toll the statute of 
limitations of § 6511’s “look back” provision, which limits the refund amount 
that a taxpayer can recover.93  The court emphasized Brockamp’s admonition 
that “[c]ourts cannot toll, for nonstatutory equitable reasons, the statutory time 
(and related amount) limitations for filing tax refund claims set forth in section 
6511.”94 
Similarly, in Davis v. United States, the taxpayer argued that he was entitled 
to equitable tolling because the statute of limitations for his estate tax refund 
claim allegedly expired before the “claim and its value came into existence.”95  
The taxpayer asserted that, because taxpayers must have “sufficient legal and 
factual grounds to file a claim for refund,” the estate could not file a claim 
during the prescribed statutory period because it did not yet have “sufficient 
grounds.”96   Although the district court was sympathetic to the taxpayer’s 
                                                     
 93. Dickow v. United States, 654 F.3d 144, 151–53 (1st Cir. 2011).  Dickow, the executor 
of the estate at issue, requested a time extension to file the estate’s tax returns, which are due nine 
months after the death of the deceased.  Id. at 146; I.R.C. § 6075(a) (2006).  He also mailed an 
estimated payment of the estate’s tax liability.  Dickow, 654 F.3d at 146.  The IRS extended the 
time deadline from October 15, 2003 to April 15, 2004.  Id.  On March 23, 2004, Dickow 
submitted a second request for a time extension, which the IRS did not approve.  Id. at 146–47.  
Dickow finally filed the estate tax return on September 30, 2004, seeking a refund of entire 
estimated payment he rendered at the time of the first extension.  Id. at 147.  The IRS refunded 
the full amount.  Id.  On September 10, 2007, Dickow filed an amended return seeking an 
additional refund, which the IRS denied as untimely.  Id.  Dickow argued that the statute of 
limitations should be tolled because the IRS “‘misrepresented’ to [him] that the second extension 
had been granted by not telling him explicitly that the request had been denied.”  Id. at 151. 
 94. See Dickow, 654 F.3d at 151–52 (quoting United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 348 
(1997), superseded by statute, Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 
Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 3202(a), 112 Stat. 685, 740–41 (codified at I.R.C. § 6511(h))). 
 95. No. 2:11-CV-00034, 2011 WL 6294467, at *1 (N.D. Miss. Dec. 15, 2011). 
 96. See id.  On February 3, 2003, Mr. Davis filed an estate tax return for a parcel of land he 
believed the decedent owned in fee simple.  Id.  Consequently, Mr. Davis reported a liability of 
nearly $500,000.  Id.  On April 17, 2003, Mr. Davis paid the IRS approximately $400,000, 
representing estate taxes, interest, and penalties.  Id.  Several months later, the Mississippi 
Chancery Court determined that the decedent held only a vested remainder in the property, rather 
than a fee simple interest.  Id.  The Mississippi Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling, and the 
Mississippi Supreme Court denied certiorari on March 2, 2006.  Id.  Mr. Davis filed an 
administrative claim with the IRS on November 4, 2008, seeking a refund of overpaid federal 
estate taxes.  Id.  The IRS denied the refund claim as untimely, asserting that the claim was not 
filed within three years of the filing of the return or two years of payment.  Id. 
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situation, it concluded that “the law directs a finding inconsistent with the 
[c]ourt’s sympathies” and rejected the claim.97 
The Court of Federal Claims also adhered to Brockamp’s principles by 
strictly interpreting § 6511(h)’s mandate that, in order to be financially 
disabled, the taxpayer may not have authorized another person to act on their 
behalf.98  In Plati v. United States, the court denied relief to a taxpayer who 
had authorized another person to act on her behalf, explaining that the 
evaluation of a taxpayer’s financial disability turns on “whether any person  
[is] ‘authorized to act on behalf of [the taxpayer] in financial matters,’ . . . not 
whether the authorized person actually took such action.” 99   Therefore, 
although the taxpayer insisted on managing her own finances, she designated 
her son to manage her financial matters and was consequently barred from 
claiming financial disability.100 
The decisions interpreting and applying § 6511(h) almost unanimously hold 
in favor of the IRS.  The effect that the statute has in causing the IRS to 
concede to equitable tolling in unclear, because these cases do not become 
public.  Section 6511(h) seemingly has not opened the floodgates to cases 
involving claims of financial disability because the provision provides only a 
narrow exception to one circumstance in which a limited time frame can bar 
full recovery. 
2.  Judicial Treatment of Revenue Procedure 99-21 
Courts have reached different conclusions on how to apply Revenue 
Procedure 99-21’s requirements for documenting a medically determinable 
                                                     
 97. Id. at *1–2.  Dickow and Davis suggest that § 6511(h) may be insufficient to address the 
complexities of estate tax cases.  Similarly, the strict tolling provisions in § 6511 may not be 
suitable for other complex issues that require lengthy litigation before a refund claim can be filed.  
See, e.g., Haas v. United States, 107 Fed. Cl. 1, 3–4 (2012) (declining to equitably toll § 6511 for 
a veteran who missed the filing deadline because of litigation about his medical disability 
benefits).  The taxpayer in Haas was a seventy-five-year-old Vietnam veteran.  Id. at 3.  In 2001, 
he requested that the Department of Veterans Affairs declare that his medical conditions resulted 
from his military service.  Id.  The Department eventually accommodated his request, and, 
consequently, the taxpayer’s disability compensation was not taxable income.  Id.  In 2010, the 
taxpayer filed an amended income tax return to obtain a refund for the tax payments he made 
from 2001 to 2009.  Id. at 3–4.  The IRS granted refunded the payments from 2007 to 2009, but 
denied the refund claims for 2001 to 2006 as untimely.  Id. at 4.  The taxpayer filed suit in the 
Court of Federal Claims, arguing that he was unable to file an amended tax return until 2010 
because of the delay in the decision on his claim for veterans benefits.  Id.  The court refused to 
equitably toll the statute of limitations and held that the refund claims for tax years 2001 to 2006 
were untimely. 
 98. See Plati v. United States, 99 Fed. Cl. 634, 640 (2011). 
 99. Plati, 99 Fed. Cl. at 640–41 (quoting Bova v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 449, 458 n.12 
(2008)).  The taxpayer, Ms. Plati, designated her son as her attorney-in-fact and granted him the 
authority to manage her financial affairs.  Id. at 635.  However, Ms. Plati “‘insist[ed] on keeping 
control’ and ‘did not let [her son] have control or authority to act for her.’”  Id. at 640. 
 100. Id. at 641. 
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illness to establish financial disability.101  Generally, the failure to include a 
physician’s statement with a taxpayer’s medical records precludes relief.102  
Additionally, a majority of courts strictly interpret Revenue Procedure 99-21 
and not only require a physician’s statement, but also demand that the 
statement meet a standard of specificity. 
For example, in Bowman v. IRS, the court declined to toll the statute of 
limitations because, although the taxpayer submitted a fairly comprehensive 
physician statement, the statement was technically deficient for failure to 
include the dates of treatment or an adequate basis for the physician’s 
diagnosis.103  The court explained the requirements for proving a medically 
determinable illness, but noted that “[w]here a physician substantially complies 
with Revenue Procedure 99-21, technical deficiencies may be cured by a 
supplemental statement.”104  Accordingly, the court directed the taxpayer to 
submit a supplemental statement detailing the dates of treatment and 
describing the doctor’s diagnosis.105  However, the taxpayer failed to provide 
the additional information, and the court dismissed the claim.106 
Similarly, in Pleconis v. IRS, the court denied the taxpayer’s request to toll 
the statute of limitations for the period of time during which he underwent five 
                                                     
 101. See, e.g., Abston v. Comm’r, 691 F.3d 992, 993 (8th Cir. 2012) (concluding that the 
plaintiff did not comply with the requirements in Revenue Procedure 99-21 because he did not 
submit a physician’s statement despite being told to do so).  Compare Bowman v. IRS, No. CIV 
S-09-0167 MCE GGH PS, 2010 WL 2991712, at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 29, 2010) (holding that 
technically deficient physician’s statement can be cured by supplemental physician statements to 
comply with Revenue Procedure 99-21), and Walter v. United States, No. 09-420, 2009 WL 
5062391, at *10 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 16, 2009) (same), with Estate of Rubinstein v. United States, 96 
Fed. Cl. 640, 652 (2011) (citing Ibeagwa v. United States, No. 09 C 1267, 2009 WL 3172165, at 
*2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2009) and Nunn v. United States, No. 3:08CV-199-S, 2009 WL 260803, at 
*4 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 4, 2009)) (requiring “[s]trict compliance” with Revenue Procedure 99-21). 
 102. See, e.g., Abston, 691 F.3d at 993–95 (rejecting the taxpayer’s request for equitable 
tolling because she failed to submit physician statement); Henry v. United States, No.  
3:05-CV-1409-D, 2006 WL 3780878, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 26, 2006) (explaining that a 
physician’s written statement “is necessary to claim financial disability” and consequently 
dismissing the taxpayer’s claim because she failed to submit a statement). 
 103. Bowman, 2010 WL 2991712, at * 4–5 (reproducing the physician’s statement, which 
certified “that Mr. Bowman, who is 48, has been suffering from years of chronic daily headaches 
with clear migraine characteristics.  They have been intense and daily for over six years with the 
last two years being more intense even. . . .  In these conditions it is understandable that his 
concentration and productivity is greatly affected and therefore feasible that for medical reasons 
he has at times in the last years been unable to fulfil[l] his duties of doing the tax return in a 
timely fashion. . . .  This statement is signed by Marc Lenaerts M.D., and dated October 28, 
2009.”). 
 104. Id. at *4 (citing Walter, 2010 WL 724445, at *4).  Cf. Jardine v. United States,  
No. C12-1421RSL, 2013 WL 195674, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 17, 2013) (distinguishing Bowman 
and Walter and denying the plaintiff’s refund claim because the physician’s statement did not 
provide any information about the taxpayer’s physical or mental state). 
 105. Bowman, 2010 WL 2991712, at *4–5. 
 106. Bowman v. I.R.S., NO. 2:09-CV-00167-MCE-GGH PS, 2010 WL 3516685, at *1 (E.D. 
Cal. Sept. 8, 2010). 
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back surgeries and two heart surgeries.107  The taxpayer submitted a physician 
statement that explained that “[t]he surgeries, rehabilitation and pain 
medication could be expected to have an adverse effect on the [taxpayer’s] 
ability to carry about business and personal activities either correctly or in a 
timely fashion.”108  However, after a strict application of Revenue Procedure 
99-21, the court held that these statements were insufficient because the 
Revenue Procedure requires a physician assert that the injury actually 
“prevented the taxpayer from managing [his] financial affairs.”109 
Other courts have interpreted Revenue 99-21’s requirements more liberally.  
In Walter v. United States, the taxpayer submitted a physician’s statement that 
attributed the taxpayer’s failure to file his tax return to his clinical 
depression. 110   The taxpayer subsequently submitted a more thorough 
supplemental statement.111  The IRS argued that the taxpayer could not submit 
a supplemental statement, and that the initial documentation was insufficient 
because it did not specifically assert that the taxpayer’s clinical depression 
“prevented him from managing his financial affairs.”112  The court held that the 
taxpayer substantially complied with Revenue Procedure 99-21 by submitting 
the initial physician’s statement and the subsequent supplemental letter, and 
tolled the statute of limitations.113 
                                                     
 107. Pleconis v. IRS, No. 09-5970, 2011 WL 3502057, at *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 10, 2011) (noting 
that Mr. Pleconis also suffered from sleep apnea, obstructive sleep, and restless leg syndrome).  
Mr. Pleconis and his wife failed to file joint tax returns returns from 1999 to 2003 because of Mr. 
Pleconis’s “extreme medical circumstances.”  Id. at *1.  Consequently, the IRS levied their bank 
account to satisfy the interest and penalties that had accrued.  Id.  The IRS denied Mr. Pleconis’s 
refund claim because he filed outside of the statute of limitations, and subsequently declined to 
toll the statute of limitations.  Id. at *2. 
 108. Id. at *5. 
 109. See Pleconis at *5.  Additionally, the district court examined the extent of Pleconis’s 
injuries, noting that he was “able to talk on the phone, watch television, surf the internet, drive to 
the pharmacy for his prescriptions, and do ‘light grocery shopping.’”  Id. at *2.  This evidence 
undercut the argument that Mr. Pleconis could not file his tax returns because of his medical 
conditions.  Id. at *6. 
 110. Walter v. United States, No. 09-420, 2009 WL 5062391, at *9 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 16, 2009) 
(detailing the physician’s statement, which concluded, “with a reasonable degree of medical 
certainty,” that the plaintiff’s failure to file his tax returns “was a result of his clinical 
depression”). 
 111. Id.  The doctor’s supplemental letter stated: “It is my medical opinion, with a reasonable 
degree of medical certainty that Mr. Walter has lacked since 2002 the mental capacity to handle 
financial affairs (possessed by a normal person), let alone do something as relatively complicated 
as completing and filing income tax returns.”  Id. 
 112. Id. at *9–10. 
 113. Id. at *11. 
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III.  CONTINUING EFFORTS TO EXPAND RELIEF FOR LATE FILERS 
A.  Tolling of Statutes of Limitations Within the Internal Revenue Code 
The Code contains three additional statutory provisions that allow taxpayers 
to toll statutes of limitations.  These three statutes provide a potentially useful 
structure to draw from in building a better and broader financial disability 
statute. 
1.  Section 7508 
Section 7508 is part of a series of special tax provisions for members of the 
armed services that trace their history back to the passage of the Sixteenth 
Amendment in 1913. 114   Changes to these provisions have generally run 
parallel to the United States’ involvement in foreign conflicts.115  Congress 
enacted the first general waiver provision for limitations periods in the Code 
with the Revenue Act of 1921.116  This waiver was not specific to individuals 
serving in combat zones, but it nonetheless addressed the need to extend 
statutory limitations periods under certain circumstances.117 
World War II prompted the first extension of limitations periods for certain 
individuals affected by war conditions.118  The Revenue Act of 1942 added  
§ 3804, which extended “the time specified for the performance of certain acts 
where the ability to do or perform those acts would or might be affected by the 
war.”119  This wartime provision further extended the time for performance of 
                                                     
 114. I.R.C. § 7508 (2006); Richard W. Rousseau, Update: Tax Benefits for Military 
Personnel in a Combat Zone or Qualified Hazardous Duty Area, ARMY LAWYER, Dec. 1999, at 1 
(“Since the inception of the first modern income taxation in the United States in 1913, special 
federal income tax benefits have been granted for service members.”). 
 115. See Edward A. Beck, III, The Taxation of Members of the Armed Services: Legislative 
and Administrative Changes Arising from the Persian Gulf Conflict, 38 FED. B. NEWS & J. 350, 
350 (1991).  Earlier legislation provided benefits to service members with federal income tax 
exclusions.  See id.  In addition to the time-limit extensions granted to active service members 
discussed in this Article, the Code also exempts pay to active service members from taxation.  See 
id. at 1–2.  For a detailed discussion of the evolution of tax exclusions for members of the Armed 
Forces, see generally id. 
 116. See 15 JACOB MERTENS, JR., MERTENS THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION  
§ 57:2 (2011) (citing Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 250(d), 42 Stat. 227, 265–66). 
 117. See § 250(d), 42 Stat. at 265–66.  Section 250(d) provided that the statute of limitations 
would apply “unless both the Commissioner and the taxpayer consent in writing to a later 
determination, assessment, and collection of the tax.”  Id.  The modern IRC contains a similar 
provision.  See I.R.C. § 6501(c)(4) (2006). 
 118. Patrick J. Kusiak, Income Tax Exclusion for Military Personnel: Examining the 
Historical Development, Discerning Underlying Principles, and Identifying Areas for Change, 39 
FED. B. NEWS & J. 146, 146–47 (“Members of the Armed Forces serving during World War II 
were beneficiaries of a host of tax exemptions and exclusions enacted during World War II.”).  
Benefits to service members included an extension of the time deadline for filing tax returns and 
paying tax liabilities.  Id. at 147. 
 119. Hamilton v. Comm’r, 13 T.C. 747, 750 (1949); see also infra note 127 and 
accompanying text (noting that § 3804 was amended and recodified within the IRC). 
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certain acts to include those in any period during which any individual traveled 
outside of the United States for more than ninety days and for an additional  
ninety days following his or her return.120  The time extension applied to any 
individual caught outside of the country during the war, not just service 
members. 121   Congressional reports noted that extending the statute of 
limitations was necessary because filing refund claims or paying tax liabilities 
was “impracticable or impossible” during periods of war.122 
Following World War II, Congress has repeatedly allowed for the extension 
of certain limitations periods as the United States continues to involve itself in 
foreign conflicts, but generally only for members of the Armed Forces.123  
Congress revised the time-limit extensions to accommodate individuals either 
serving directly in, or in support of, the Armed Forces in areas designated as 
combat zones.124  Congress also extended these benefits to individuals who are 
hospitalized abroad for injuries sustained during service in a combat zone.125  
The amount of time the extension grants generally equals the length of service 
and hospitalization plus an additional 180 days. 126   In 1954, § 3804 was 
recodified within § 7508.127  Congress has since revised § 7508 to include 
individuals serving in specific foreign conflicts.128   The extension of time 
                                                     
 120. See Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 753, § 507, 56 Stat. 798, 961. 
 121. Id.  Section 3804 is not only broader than its successor—§ 7508—in the scope of to 
whom it provided relief, but also in the area it covers.  Compare id. (extending relief to any 
individual outside of the United States during World War II), with I.R.C. § 7508 (2006) 
(extending relief to individuals serving in the Armed Forces in designated combat zones). 
 122. Hamilton, 13 T.C. at 750 (noting that the House’s discussion of § 7508 was limited to its 
practicality). 
 123. See MERTENS, supra note 116, at § 57:2.  In the past few decades, the Code has been 
amended to address foreign conflicts in which the United States has been engaged.  See id. 
 124. See id.  According to the IRS: 
Combat zones are designated by an Executive Order from the President as areas in 
which the Armed Forces are engaging or have engaged in combat.  There are currently 
three such combat zones (including airspace above each): [1] Arabian Peninsula Areas, 
beginning Jan. 17, 1991. . . .  Kosovo area, beginning Mar. 24, 1999. . . .  Afghanistan, 
beginning Sept. 19, 2001. . . .  In addition, the Department of Defense has certified a 
number of locations for combat zone tax benefits due to their direct support of military 
operations. 
Combat Zones, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/uac/Combat-Zones (last updated May 6, 2013).  For a 
discussion of qualified service in a combat zone and the benefits of such service, see Combat 
Zone Tax Exclusions, MILITARY.COM, http://www.military.com/benefits/military-pay/special 
-pay/combat-zone-tax-exclusions.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2013).  See also Rachel Ney, Assisting 
Military Clients, in 2 EFFECTIVELY REPRESENTING YOUR CLIENT BEFORE THE IRS § 23.1,  
§ 23.5.4 (T. Keith Fogg, ed., 5th ed. 2011). 
 125. MERTENS, supra note 116, at § 57:2. 
 126. Id. 
 127. See S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 616 (1954) (explaining that the § 7508 “contains no 
material change in existing law” and “continues in the law those provisions of section 3804 of the 
1939 Code”). 
 128. Section 7508 was first revised to accommodate those serving in the Armed Forces in 
Vietnam.  See S. REP. NO. 94-1319, at 3–4 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6061, 6063 
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created by § 7508 occurs for everyone covered by the statute and does not 
depend on the discretion of the IRS. 
2.  Section 7508A 
In 1997, Congress enacted § 7508A, which closely resembles § 7508 in 
providing broad coverage to a class of identified persons but differs in 
operation. 129   Section 7508 suspends time limitations within the Code for 
service members, whereas § 7508A provides the opportunity for similar relief 
to taxpayers affected by disasters.130  Section 7508A contains a broad catch-all 
provision that authorizes the Treasury to promulgate regulations to allow the 
IRS to suspend the time limitations for actions  “required or permitted under 
the internal revenue laws specified by the Secretary of the Treasury” for up to 
one year.131   Section 7508A authorizes, but does not mandate, the IRS to 
                                                                                                                          
–64 (extending certain tax benefits to individuals serving in Vietnam who were missing in action 
or hospitalized).  In 1976, Congress again revised § 7508—which had previously extended 
benefits to those individuals affected “by reason of war”—to extend benefits to individuals 
affected “by reason of service in combat zone.”  Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455,  
§ 1906(a)(51)(A), 90 Stat. 1520, 1831 (codified at I.R.C. § 7508 (2006)).  Congress subsequently 
extended § 7508 relief several times to accommodate specific conflicts.  See, e.g., Act of Jan. 31, 
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-2, 105 Stat. 5, 5–6 (codified at I.R.C. § 7508) (including those serving in 
the Gulf War); Act of Mar. 20, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-117, § 1, 110 Stat. 827, 827–28 
(accommodating those serving in Bosnia, Herzogovina, Croatia, and Macedonia); Act of Apr. 19, 
1999, Pub. L. No. 106-21, § 1(a)(8), 113 Stat. 34 (extending relief to service members in Kosovo 
and the surrounding areas).  Regarding the Kosovo conflict, President Clinton stated: “With our 
citizens working so hard to protect the people of Kosovo, they shouldn’t have to worry about their 
taxes.”  Tax Legislation: Clinton to Issue Executive Order by April 15 to Give Tax Relief to U.S. 
Troops in Kosovo, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 70, at G–1 (Apr. 13, 1999), available at 1999 WL 
291069.  In 2003, Congress revised § 7508 to include “contingency operations” in addition to 
combat zones.  Military Family Tax Relief Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-121, § 104(b)(2), 117 
Stat. 1335, 1338 (codified at I.R.C. § 7508). 
 129. See Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 911(a), 111 Stat. 788, 877 
(codified at I.R.C. § 7508A (2006 & Supp. 2012)). 
 130. Compare I.R.C. § 7508(a) (applying “[i]n the case of an individual serving in the Armed 
Forces of the United States, or serving in support of such Armed Forces”), with I.R.C. § 7508A(a) 
(applying “[i]n the case of a taxpayer”).  Congress created § 7508A relief after many high-profile 
disasters.  See, e.g., Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-604, § 211(c), 
104 Stat. 3066, 3085 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 5570 (2006)) (providing limited tax benefits to 
victims of the December 21, 1988 terrorist attack on Pam Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, 
Scotland); Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-135, 119 Stat. 2577 (codified in 
scattered sections of I.R.C.) (extending “tax benefits for the Gulf Opportunity Zone and certain 
areas affect by Hurricanes Rita and Wilma”); Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005, Pub. L. 
No. 109-73, 119 Stat. 2016 (codified in scattered sections of I.R.C.) (granting “emergency tax 
relief for persons affected by Hurricane Katrina”). 
 131. I.R.C. § 7508(a)(1)(K); see I.R.C. § 7508A(a)(1) (adopting the list of triggering actions 
in § 7508).  Treasury Regulation § 301.7508A-1 defines the scope of §7508A’s catch-all 
provision and includes “any other act specified in a revenue ruling, revenue procedure, notice, 
announcement, news release, or other guidance published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin.”  
Treas. Reg. § 301.7508A-1(c)(1)(vii) (2012). 
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suspend taxpayers’ obligations under the Code following a “federally-declared 
disaster.”132 
While § 7508 and § 7508A are similar in scope, § 7508A gives the IRS 
greater discretion in granting relief.  Each of the two statutes creates a zone, 
and when compared, the zones aid in illustrating the amount of IRS authority.  
When Congress creates a combat zone, the statutory provisions automatically 
extend numerous time periods set out in the Internal Revenue Code for the 
time that qualified taxpayers spend in the combat zone, plus an additional 180 
days.133  However, when the President declares a disaster under § 7508A, the 
IRS must analyze the nature and scope of the disaster and create a response 
tailored to that disaster in order to suspend the relevant time limitations.134  
Congress’s willingness to give to the IRS the authority to make decisions on 
whether and how much relief to grant within the parameters set by Congress 
shows again that Congress wants to get out of the business of passing 
legislation with minute details of the nature and scope of relief, similar to a 
private bill.  Instead, it adopts a model, as it did in section 6511(h) and in 
section 408(d)(3)(I), discussed below, to pass this authority to the Agency. 
3.  Section 408(d)(3)(I) 
In 2001, Congress enacted § 408(d)(3)(I), adding another statutory provision 
that extends time limitations under the Code.135  Section 408(d)(3)(I) permits 
the Treasury to waive the sixty-day rollover requirement for individual 
retirement accounts (IRAs) if “the failure to waive such requirement would be 
against equity or good conscience, including casualty, disaster, or other events 
                                                     
 132. See IRC § 7508A(a).  A “federally declared disaster” is “any disaster subsequently 
determined by the President of the United States to warrant assistance by the Federal Government 
under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act.”  I.R.C.  
§ 165(h)(3)(C)(i) (2006 & Supp. 2012). 
 133. I.R.C. § 7508(a). 
 134. The process of declaring a disaster under § 7508A begins with the affected state’s 
governor requesting aid from the federal government.  The Declaration Process, FEMA, 
http://www.fema.gov/declaration-process (last updated June 13, 2012).  The President, with the 
help of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), determines the scope of the 
disaster area and the scope of relief.  See id.  (explaining that the President decides where to 
declare a disaster and whether to extend individual or public assistance).  See generally Disaster 
Relief and Emergency Assistance Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-707, 102 Stat. 4689 
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (detailing the disaster-declaration process).  After the 
President declares a disaster, the IRS evaluates the disaster’s impact on taxpayers’ obligations 
under the IRC and issues a notice setting out the tax consequences.  See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice  
2001-61, 2001-40 I.R.B. 305 (providing tax relief to the presidentially-declared disaster areas of 
New York City, Western Pennsylvania, and the Pentagon in Northern Virginia after the 9-11 
terrorist attacks); I.R.S. Notice 2001-63, 2001-40 I.R.B. 308 (same).  However, although 
Congress authorized the IRS to determine what and how much relief to provide, the IRS does not 
make this decision in a vacuum.  The disaster areas are represented by members of Congress who 
will make their views known if the IRS’s response is not appropriate. 
 135. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16,  
§ 644(b), 115 Stat. 38, 123 (codified at I.R.C. § 408). 
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beyond the reasonable control of the individual subject to such 
requirement.”136   Section 408(d)(3)(I)’s legislative history details situations 
that justify waiver of the sixty-day period for filing, such as the failure to cash 
checks, “errors committed by a financial institution, restrictions imposed by a 
foreign country, or postal error.”137  Waiver may also be justified by death, 
disability, hospitalization, or incarceration.138  Perhaps because the sixty-day 
time period is short and during such a short time period death, hospitalization, 
or incarceration could have an impact on failing to act within the statutory time 
frame, Congress did not believe a longer period, such as the two or three year 
period of 6511(h) would merit.  Still, Section 408(d)(3)(I) opens the door for 
additional bases for suspension not considered when Congress passed 6511(h). 
Additionally, § 408(d)(3)(A)(i) imposes different procedural obligations.  
Revenue Procedure 2003-16 requires taxpayers to apply to the IRS for a 
private letter ruling to obtain relief under § 408(d)(3)(A)(i). 139    If the 
transaction meets certain safe-harbor provisions, approval through the private 
letter ruling process is not required.140  Furthermore, the Revenue Procedure’s 
“[r]equirements for a favorable ruling” provision provides additional bases for 
suspension, including “casualty, disaster or other events beyond the reasonable 
control of the taxpayer.”141  The Revenue Procedure also offers avenues for 
relief that § 6511(h) does not consider.142 
                                                     
 136. See I.R.C. § 408(d)(3)(I) (2006).  After a taxpayer receives funds from an IRA, there is a 
sixty-day time limitation to complete the rollover to another IRA.  See I.R.C. § 408(d)(3)(A)(1).  
If the taxpayer does not complete the rollover within sixty days, the funds he received from the 
IRA will be treated as ordinary income.  I.R.C. § 408(d)(1).  The IRS considers “all relevant facts 
and circumstances” in determining whether the taxpayer is entitled to the waiver of the sixty-day 
limitation, including: 
[W]hether errors were made by the financial institution (in addition to those described 
under automatic waiver, above); whether you were unable to complete the rollover due 
to death, disability, hospitalization, incarceration, restrictions imposed by a foreign 
country or postal error; whether you used the amount distributed (for example, in the 
case of payment by check, whether you cashed the check); and how much time has 
passed since the date of distribution. 
Retirement Plans FAQs Relating to Waivers of the 60-Day Rollover Requirement, IRS, 
http://www.irs.gov/Retirement-Plans/Retirement-Plans-FAQs-relating-to-Waivers-of-the-60-Day 
-Rollover-Requirement (last updated Mar. 26, 2013). 
 137. H.R. REP. NO. 107-84, at 252–53 (2001) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 2001 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
46, 178. 
 138. Rev. Proc. 2003-16, 2003-4 I.R.B. 359.  The IRS has issued approximately eight 
hundred private letter rulings since the inception of the program. 
 139. Id. 
 140. See id. at 359–60 (detailing the requirements for automatic approval).  The transaction 
will be automatically approved if the financial institution actually received the rollover funds 
within sixty days, together with appropriate instructions, and the failure to complete the rollover 
resulted solely from the institution’s error.  Id. at 360. 
 141. Id. at 359. 
 142. Compare id. (extending the time limitation for a variety of events “beyond the 
reasonable control of the taxpayer”), with I.R.C. § 6511(h)(2)(A) (2006) (tolling the statute of 
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B.  Tolling of Statutes of Limitations Outside of the Internal Revenue Code 
1.  Legislative Efforts 
Just as Congress sought to expand financial disability relief by enacting  
§ 6511(h), it similarly has revised other inequitable statutes of limitations.  For 
example, in 1998, Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company employee Lily 
Ledbetter brought a pay discrimination action against Goodyear after 
discovering that she earned significantly less than three male employees in the 
same position.143  However, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Ledbetter’s suit 
was barred by the statute of limitations, even though she was unaware of the 
discrimination during the statutory timeframe and did not learn of the unequal 
pay until years later. 144   The Court concluded that, under the applicable  
180-day limitations period, Ledbetter should have filed suit within six months 
of receiving her first discriminatory paycheck.145 
In response to the Supreme Court’s ruling, Democrats in the House of 
Representatives sought to amend the statute so that the 180-day statute of 
limitations would restart with each discriminatory paycheck received by the 
employee.146  George Miller, House Education and Labor Chairman, stated that 
the bill “will make it clear that discrimination occurs not just when the decision 
to discriminate is made, but also when someone becomes subject to that 
discriminatory decision, and when they are affected by that discriminatory 
decision.”147  The Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay Act extended the time frame in 
which an employee may bring a pay discrimination action by expanding the 
definition of “unlawful employment practice;” actionable illegal activity now 
occurs “when a discriminatory compensation or other practice is adopted, 
when an individual becomes subject to a discriminatory compensation decision 
or other practice, or when an individual is affected by application of a 
discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, including each time, 
wages, benefits, or other compensation is paid.”148 
                                                                                                                          
limitations only for physical or mental impairment that “can be expected to result in death or 
[that] has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months”). 
 143. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 621–22 (2007), superseded by 
statute, Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5. 
 144. Id. at 632. 
 145. Id. at 628 (“Ledbetter should have filed an EEOC charge within 180 days after each 
allegedly discriminatory pay decision was made and communicated to her.”).  The Supreme Court 
reasoned that the 180-day statute of limitations “reflects Congress’ strong preference for the 
prompt resolution of employment discrimination allegations through voluntary conciliation and 
cooperation.”  Id. at 630–31. 
 146. Jesse J. Holland, House Dems Target Court’s Pay Ruling, USA TODAY (June 12, 2007, 
4:45 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2007-06-12-2953732132_x.htm. 
 147. See id.  The Senate initially struck down the bill, but it was reintroduced and ultimately 
passed in early 2009.  Id.  The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act was the first piece of legislation 
signed into law by President Obama.  Id. 
 148. § 3, 123 Stat. at 5–6 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3) (A) (Supp. 2012)). 
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2.  Judicial Efforts 
Although time limitations in the Internal Revenue Code may not allow for 
equitable tolling due to their “unusually emphatic” and “technical” 
language,149 courts have relied on Irwin to equitably toll statutes of limitations 
in other areas of law that do.  In Irwin, the Supreme Court held that the 
“rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling applicable to suits against private 
defendants should also apply to suits against the United States.”150  Since that 
decision, the Court has applied equitable tolling principles in several other 
statutory contexts.151 
In 2010, the Supreme Court tolled the one-year statute of limitations 
imposed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).152  
Under the AEDPA, an individual in custody generally must file a request for 
habeas corpus relief within one year from the date on which his or her 
conviction became final.153  This one-year time limitation is statutorily tolled 
for the period in which any properly filed post-conviction relief is pending in 
state court.154  In addition to statutory tolling, the one-year limitations period 
may also be equitably tolled.155  In Holland v. Florida, the Court held that, 
because the AEDPA’s statute of limitations is not jurisdictional, it is “subject 
                                                     
 149. United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 350 (1997), superseded by statute, Internal 
Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 3202(a), 112 
Stat. 685, 740–41 (codified at I.R.C. § 6511(h)). 
 150. Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95–96 (1990). 
 151. See, e.g., Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010) (equitably tolling the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s statute of limitations for a habeas corpus 
petition); John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 140–43 (2008) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (discussing equitable tolling principles in response to the majority’s refusal to toll the 
six-year time limitation to file a suit against the United States in the Court of Federal Claims); 
Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401, 423 (2004) (permitting an untimely amendment of a fee 
application under Equal Access to Justice Act). 
 152. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2560–61. 
 153. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2006).  A petitioner must file a habeas petition from the latest 
of: (1) the date the judgment became final; (2) the date an impediment to filing is removed;  
(3) the date the Supreme Court recognizes a constitutional right; or (4) the date “the factual 
predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due 
diligence.”  Id.  Before the AEDPA was enacted, federal habeas corpus petitions were not subject 
to a statute of limitations.  Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 214 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 154. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).  Because of the complexities involved in calculating the 
one-year statute of limitations, the Supreme Court has heard twelve AEDPA statute of limitations 
cases since the statute’s enactment.  See Anne R. Traum, Last Best Chance for the Great Writ: 
Equitable Tolling and Federal Habeas Corpus, 68 MD. L. REV. 545, 553–54 (2009). 
 155. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2560.  The AEDPA itself does not identify circumstances under 
which the statute of limitations can be tolled, as does § 6511(h) and § 408(d)(3)(I).  Compare 28 
U.S.C. § 2244 (making no mention of tolling), with I.R.C. § 6511(h) (2006) (suspending the 
statute of limitations during periods of financial disability), and I.R.C. § 408(d)(3)(I) (waiving the 
sixty-day time deadline if “the failure to waive such requirement would be against equity or good 
conscience, including casualty, disaster, or other events beyond the reasonable control” of the 
taxpayer). 
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to a rebuttable presumption in favor of equitable tolling.” 156   The Court 
concluded that, because habeas relief is based in equity and the statute “differs 
significantly” from the tax provision at issue in Brockamp, the presumption of 
equitable tolling applied.157  Consequently, courts have the discretion to award 
habeas relief to petitioners who would otherwise be denied relief for failing to 
file within the limitations timeframe. 
To qualify for equitable tolling, a habeas petitioner must establish “‘(1) that 
he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary 
circumstance stood in his way’ and prevented timely filing.” 158   Such 
extraordinary circumstances have been defined as those in which “it would be 
unconscionable to enforce the limitation period . . . and gross injustice would 
result.”159  Although a habeas petitioner is entitled to equitable relief in limited 
circumstances, the judiciary has at least provided a petitioner who files an 
untimely request the opportunity to argue for equitable tolling.  Furthermore, 
tax litigants may benefit from Holland’s “‘rebuttable presumption’ in favor ‘of 
equitable tolling.’”160  The holding in Holland signals that future courts may 
conclude that certain provisions in the IRC are not jurisdictional, therefore 
providing taxpayers with the opportunity for equitable relief.161 
3.  Administrative Responses 
Treasury Regulation section 301.9100-3 allows taxpayers who fail to make a 
timely election for certain administrative, rather than statutory, deadlines to 
                                                     
 156. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2560.  Compare Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. 
Ct. 1197, 1200 (2011), in which the Supreme Court concluded that the statute of limitations of the 
appeal of a Board of Veterans’ Appeals decision was not jurisdictional.  The Court reasoned that 
the statute did not indicate that the time limitation “was meant to carry jurisdictional 
consequences,” id. at 1204, indicating that congressional intent is an important factor in 
determining whether a statute of limitations can be equitably tolled.  The Court explained that, 
because “filing deadlines . . . are quintessential claim-processing rules,” they should not be 
jurisdictional unless Congress has clearly indicated that the rule is jurisdictional.  Id. at 1203. 
 157. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2560–61.  The Court emphasized that the statute at issue in 
Brockamp “‘se[t] forth its time limitations in unusually emphatic form,’” using “‘technical’ 
language.”  Id. (quoting United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 350 (1997), superseded by 
statute, Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206,  
§ 3202(a), 112 Stat. 685, 740–41 (codified at I.R.C. § 6511(h))).   The Court reasoned that the 
AEDPA’s statute of limitations does not contain “unusually emphatic” language and that 
equitable tolling would not affect the merits of a petition for habeas corpus.  Id. 
 158. Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336 (2007) (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 
408, 418 (2005)). 
 159. Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2006).  For example, several circuits 
consider “sufficiently egregious misconduct” by a petitioner’s counsel sufficient to toll the 
limitations period.  See, e.g., Fleming v. Evans, 481 F.3d 1249, 1256 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 160. Holland,130 S.Ct. at 2560 (quoting Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89,  
95–96 (1990)).  For a discussion of Holland’s application to tax cases involving equitable tolling, 
see Smith, Cracks Appear in the Code’s ‘Jurisdictional’ Time Provisions, supra note 8. 
 161. See Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1202–03 (observing that the Court has “tried in recent 
cases to bring some discipline to the use of” the jurisdictional label). 
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request relief.162  To obtain relief under section 301.9100-3, the taxpayer must 
show that he “acted reasonably and in good faith, and [that] the grant of relief 
will not prejudice the interests of the Government.”163  The taxpayer can meet 
the requirements of reasonableness and good faith if he: 
[1] [r]equests relief . . . before the failure to make the regulatory 
election is discovered by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS); [2] 
[f]ailed to make the election because of intervening events beyond 
the taxpayer’s control; [3] [r]easonably relied on the written advice 
of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS); or [4] [r]easonably relied on a 
qualified tax professional, including a tax professional employed by 
the taxpayer, and the tax professional failed to make, or advise the 
taxpayer to make, the election.164 
The taxpayer must also make the request using the private letter ruling 
procedure, which, like § 408(d)(3)(I), provides transparency.165  In the request, 
the taxpayer must show that he acted reasonably and good faith—consistent 
with the factors listed in the regulation—and that granting the request will not 
prejudice the IRS. 166   Section 301.9100-3 also includes a broad catch-all 
provision for additional relief.167 
Similarly, in 1998, Congress added § 6015(f) to the IRC, known as the 
innocent spouse provision.168  The IRS imposed a two-year filing deadline 
                                                     
 162. See Treas. Reg. § 301.9100-3(a)–(c) (2012) (listing the various circumstances under 
which a request for an extension may be granted). 
 163. Treas. Reg. § 301.9100-3(a). 
 164. Treas. Reg. § 301.9100-3(b). 
 165. Treas. Reg. § 301.9100-3(e)(5) (“A request for relief under this section is a request for a 
letter ruling.”); Rev. Proc. 2003-16, 2003-4 I.R.B. 359 (requiring a private letter ruling under  
§ 408(d)(3)).  Private letter rulings add a level of transparency to IRC proceedings because the 
IRS is required to publish private letter determinations.  See I.R.C. § 6110(a) (2006) (“[T]he text 
of any written determination and any background file document relating to such written 
determination shall be open to public inspection at such place as the Secretary may by regulations 
prescribe.”). 
 166. Treas. Reg. 301.9100-3(c)(1) (“The Commissioner will grant a reasonable extension of 
time to make a regulatory election only when the interest of the Government will not be 
prejudiced by the granting of the relief.”). 
 167. See Treas. Reg. 301.9100-3(b)(1)(ii) (granting relief if the taxpayer “[f]ailed to make the 
election because of intervening events beyond the taxpayer’s control”). 
 168. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, 
§ 3201(a), 112 Stat. 685, 734 (codified at I.R.C. § 6015 (2006)) (providing relief from the joint 
and several liability for the failure to file a joint tax return imposed by § 6013(d)(3)).  The 
Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act also directed the IRS to create provisions 
of offers-in-compromise in situations in which the taxpayer would not have sufficient “means to 
provide for basic living expenses” were he to satisfy his outstanding tax liabilities.  § 3462(a), 
112 Stat. at 764–65 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 7122 (2006)).  The equitable provisions for  
offers-in-compromise do not relate to time frames and are outside of the scope of this Article. 
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within the provision, but, after years of taxpayers challenging its validity,169 
the IRS withdrew the time limitation.170 
Individuals who seek innocent spouse relief are frequently unable to file 
their claims in a timely manner.  In many instances, the nature of the spousal 
relationship that creates the need for innocent spouse relief—domination, 
manipulation, or domestic violence—also leaves the victim in a vulnerable 
financial and emotional state that makes it difficult to meet statutory 
deadlines.171  The cases that address the § 6015(f) regulations have revealed a 
vulnerable population.172 
For example, in Mannella v. Commissioner, Mrs. Mannella missed the 
innocent spouse provision’s two-year filing deadline because her husband hid 
the couple’s mail and refused to allow her to see it.173  Although she eventually 
obtained relief after the IRS withdrew the two-year rule, the court noted that 
Mrs. Mannella’s case warranted equitable tolling.174  The circumstances in 
cases like Mannella highlight the need for equitable remedies for taxpayers 
who miss filing deadlines due to circumstances beyond their control.  
Addressing this need requires a statute that does not limit financial disability to 
physical and mental impairment.  The IRS has administratively acknowledged 
the problem and is seeking to work with the bar to find language in its forms 
and guidance that will meet the needs of this group of taxpayers.175 
                                                     
 169. See, e.g., Jones v. Comm’r, 642 F.3d 459 (4th Cir. 2011) (plaintiff-taxpayer disputing 
the validity of the two-year statute of limitations in § 6015(f)); Mannella v. Comm’r, 631 F.3d 
115 (3d Cir. 2011) (same); Lantz v. Comm’r, 607 F.3d 479 (7th Cir. 2010) (same). 
 170. See I.R.S. Notice 2012-8, 2012-4 I.R.B. 309 (withdrawing Revenue Procedure 2003-61 
and proposing new equitable factors as its replacement).  Revenue Procedure 2003-61 required 
the requesting spouse file a claim for equitable relief within two years of the IRS’s first collection 
activity.  Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296.  On July 25, 2011 the IRS changed its position on 
the two-year rule in innocent spouse cases seeking equitable relief, see I.R.S. Notice 2011-70, 
2011-32 I.R.B. 135, and, on January 23, 2012, the IRS withdrew the policy in its entirety.  I.R.S. 
Notice 2012-8, 2012-4 I.R.B. 309.  The IRS eliminated the two-year requirement because the 
Commissioner concluded that the time limitation was an incorrect interpretation of the statute, 
despite the fact that the IRS was successful in defending taxpayer suits.  See supra note 169 
(listing examples of taxpayer challenges to Revenue Procedure 2003-61’s validity). 
 171. See Wilson v. Comm’r, 705 F.3 d 980, 982 (9th Cir. 2013) (observing that many 
taxpayers who discover “that they are liable for their former spouse’s tax debt” are women who 
are “victims of domestic abuse [and] whose ability to review or correct a joint [tax] return before 
it is filed is impaired”). 
 172. See, e.g., Stephenson v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (CCH) 1048, 1048–49  (2011) (noting that the 
taxpayer’s husband physically and mentally abused her and threatened her with violence for 
refusing to sign documents); Brown v. Comm’r, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 1249, 1251 (1988) (explaining 
that the taxpayer’s husband abused her and forced her to sign documents). 
 173. 631 F.3d 115, 118–19 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 174. Id. at 117. 
 175. See T. Keith Fogg, Low-Income Taxpayer Clinicians Meet with Service Representatives, 
31 A.B.A. SEC. OF TAX’N NEWS Q., Summer 2012, at 16. 
994 Catholic University Law Review  [Vol. 62:965 
IV.  CRAFTING A SOLUTION 
Congress’s current approach to suspending the IRC’s statutory time frames 
permits suspension in relatively limited circumstances.  These ad hoc sections 
that address specific, narrow circumstances do not serve the best interests of 
either taxpayers or the IRS.  Consequently, the Code should adopt a broader 
approach to granting of relief when a financially disabled taxpayer misses a 
statutory deadline.  A statutory solution is a better mechanism for relief than 
entrusting courts with applying equitable tolling on a case-by-case basis.176 
A more expansive system for suspending time periods due to excusable 
circumstances must have three characteristics.  First, the solution must be 
sufficiently broad.  For example, § 7508 and § 7508A essentially allow for the 
suspension of any time frame in the IRC, which in turn permits taxpayers to 
obtain relief in any circumstance that meets the statutory requirements. 177  
Financial disability should similarly apply to a wide range of time limitations.  
Second, the excusable circumstances for which the statute of limitations may 
be tolled must be specifically enumerated.  Drawing on Revenue Procedure 
2003-16 and equitable tolling principles,178 the circumstances should be broad 
enough to address all situations in which relief should be granted.  Third, in 
order to conserve judicial resources, the IRS should be responsible for 
determining whether a taxpayer is financially disabled, subject to judicial 
review for abuse of discretion. 
A.  Breadth of Suspension 
The legislative history of § 7508 signifies Congress’s recognition of the 
sacrifices made by those serving in combat zones and the hardships those 
individuals face.  The purpose of Section 7508 most concretely applicable to 
this article stem from the provision initially enacted in 1941; this statute 
recognized that performing certain acts under the IRC were “impracticable or 
impossible” for individuals outside of the United States during times of war.179  
Although the benefits afforded by this initial statute expired just a few years 
later with the end of World War II, Congress has since repeatedly recognized 
the need to extend the limitations periods for individuals serving in the Armed 
Forces.180 
                                                     
 176. A statutory solution will both eliminate case-by-case equitable tolling fights and 
empower the IRS to suspend statutory time frames. 
 177. See I.R.C. § 7508(a) (2006) (applying to “the internal revenue laws” and extending time 
deadlines with “respect [to] any tax liability”); I.R.C. § 7508A(a) (2006 & Supp. 2012) (same). 
 178. See Rev. Proc. 2003-16, 2003-4 I.R.B. 359 (providing broad grounds for waiving the 
sixty-day time requirement in § 408(d)(3)); see also supra notes 139–142 and accompanying text 
(discussing the requirements for waiver under Rev. Proc. 2003-16). 
 179. Hamilton v. Comm’r, 13 T.C. 747, 751 (1949). 
 180. See supra notes 123–128 and accompanying text (tracing the development of § 7508 
following World War II and describing the continued protection Congress has provided to 
members of the Armed Services). 
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While Congress has recognized the need for broad relief from statutory time 
frames for certain individuals in the military and those suffering from specified 
disasters, it has not yet initiated comprehensive relief for those suffering from 
financial disability.181  Any taxpayer subject to an IRC time deadline should 
have the right to demonstrate that he failed to meet that deadline because of an 
excusable circumstance.  The breadth of § 7508 and § 7508A make them 
attractive models for expanding the reach of financial disability relief. 
Adopting broad grounds for relief, as Congress did with § 7508 and  
§ 7508A,182 shifts the focus to the quality of the excuse for missing the time 
frame, rather than the nature of the time frame itself.  Although certain 
situations may require different, or greater, proof, no time deadline should 
preclude relief if the taxpayer has a meritorious excuse.  Congress could 
certainly enact different requirements for different sections of the IRC.  Late 
action by the taxpayer, even with an excuse, does not necessarily mean that the 
statute should grant relief.  Rather, a broader scheme for relief simply means 
that the time barrier for seeking the relief will be lifted if the taxpayer shows a 
sufficient basis for doing so. 
B.  Excusable Circumstances 
Section 6511(h) provides a very narrow path to tolling the statute of 
limitations for filing a refund claim and serves as a poor model for establishing 
broader relief provisions for at least two reasons.  First, § 6511(h)’s 
requirements for relief exclude many of the traditional bases for relief available 
in equitable tolling cases. 183   Second, Revenue Procedure 99-21 narrows  
§ 6511(h) relief even further with strict requirements that burden taxpayers, 
especially low income taxpayers. 184   Section 408(d)(3)(I) and Revenue 
Procedure 2003-16 provide better models of excusable circumstances for 
extending time deadlines.185  The list of excusable circumstances found in  
§ 408(d)(3)(I) and Revenue Procedure 2003-16 should be supplemented with 
circumstances found in equitable tolling cases in order to create a sufficiently 
                                                     
 181. See supra Part II.A. (discussing the legislative history of § 6511(h) and noting the very 
limited relief the provision provides). 
 182. See I.R.C. § 7508(a) (applying to any “individual serving in the Armed Forces of the 
United States, or serving in support of such Armed Forces, in an area designated by the President 
of the United States by Executive order as a ‘combat zone’”); I.R.C. § 7508A(a) (applying to any 
“taxpayer determined by the Secretary to be affected by a federally declared disaster”); see also 
Part III.A.1–2 (discussing the tolling provisions in § 7508 and § 7508A). 
 183. I.R.C. § 6511(h)(2)(A) (2006) (suspending the statute of limitations in § 6511 only if the 
taxpayer is “financially disabled”). 
 184. Rev. Proc. 99-21, 1999-1 C.B. 960 (requiring a detailed physician’s statement and a 
certification that the taxpayer has not authorized another person to act on his behalf); see also Part 
II.B.2 (discussing the judicial interpretation of Revenue Procedure 99-21’s requirements). 
 185. See Rev. Proc. 2003-16, 2003-4 I.R.B. 359 (tolling § 408(d)(3)(I)’s statute of limitations 
“in cases where the failure to waive [the] requirement would be against equity or good 
conscience, including casualty, disaster or other events beyond the taxpayer’s control”). 
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broad base of potential circumstances for the IRS to consider in deciding 
whether to allow an extended time frame.186  Congress should adopt a specific 
set of excusable circumstances and specifically define these circumstances to 
guide the IRS in its application of the law. 
1.  Bases for Relief 
Considering the sources described above, the following eight events serve as 
potential triggering events for suspending of the IRC’s time frames: (1) 
casualty, disaster, or other intervening events beyond the taxpayer’s control; 
(2) mental incapacity; (3) physical disability including hospitalization; (4) 
death; (5) misleading statements or guidance from IRS; (6) breach of fiduciary 
duty; (7) domestic or sexual abuse; and (8) diligent pursuit of litigation.  
Congress has already provided limited relief in the IRC for some of these 
circumstances, and courts have suggested the equitable tolling principles in 
domestic abuse situations.   A provision for broad relief from statutory time 
frames should similarly extend to these excusable circumstances. 
a.  Disasters and Other Intervening Events Beyond the Taxpayer’s 
Control 
While § 7508A protects taxpayers in “federally declared disaster” areas,187 
personal disasters—a home fire, sewer backup, or burst pipe—can pose similar 
or even greater barriers to meeting the IRC’s time deadlines.188   Revenue 
Procedure 2003-16 recognizes that personal disasters are beyond the taxpayer’s 
control and may be sufficient to suspend 408(d)(3)(I)’s time frame.189  The 
same rationale should be applied to other sections of the IRC. 
b.  Mental Incapacity 
Webb and Brockamp demonstrate the devastating impact that mental 
incapacity can have on an individual’s ability to meet the IRC’s deadlines.190  
                                                     
 186. These additional bases for relief also draw support from several of the bases for 
reasonable cause allowing the IRS to excuse late filing of a return or late payment of a liability, 
e.g., death, serious illness, erroneous advice from the IRS, fire, casualty natural disaster or other 
disturbance.  See DAVID RICHARDSON, JEROME BORISON, & STEVE JOHNSON, CIVIL TAX 
PROCEDURE 298–300 (2d ed. 2008).  The granting to the IRS of the ability to excuse penalties for 
late filing and late payment for these bases adds symmetry to the granting of authority to the IRS 
to excuse other deadlines for action. 
 187. I.R.C. § 7508A. 
 188. See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 20.1.1.3.2.2.2 (2011), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/irm/ (recognizing that “a fire, casualty, natural disaster, or other disturbance” 
may constitute cause for relief if the taxpayer exercised reasonable care but was unable to comply 
with tax obligations due to circumstances beyond his control). 
 189. See Rev. Proc. 2003-16, 2003-4 I.R.B. 359. 
 190. See Webb v. United States, 66 F.3d 691, 692–93 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting that Mrs. 
Parsons’s mental incapacity resulted in the IRS withholding $4,324,822.54 in overpaid taxes 
because she missed the filing deadline); Brockamp v. United States, 859 F. Supp. 1283, 1284–85 
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While Mrs. Parsons’s and Mr. McGill’s mental incapacity extended well 
beyond the twelve-month period required by § 6511(h),191 a shorter period of 
incapacity could also cause a taxpayer to miss a deadline.  Taxpayers therefore 
should have the opportunity to demonstrate the impact of their mental 
incapacity without a twelve-month time requirement.  Section 408(d)(3)(I), 
which does not require a lengthy period of disability to obtain relief, provides a 
more appropriate approach to determining financial disability.192 
c.  Physical Disability 
Section 6511(h) currently limits relief for physical disability to situations in 
which the taxpayer can demonstrate that the period of incapacity lasted for at 
least twelve months. 193   This length of disability imposes a barrier of 
inappropriate length.  A more appropriate inquiry is whether it is proper to 
award relief to the taxpayer, not whether the disability continued for a 
statutorily-prescribed length of time.  A short-term disability can have just as 
devastating an impact on a taxpayer’s ability to meet deadlines.  Taxpayers 
should be required to demonstrate that their physical disability caused them to 
miss the statutory deadline, but they should not be required to prove that the 
disability continued for at least twelve months.  While the duration of the 
disability may be relevant in proving that it caused the taxpayer to miss the 
deadline, it should not automatically preclude relief. 
d.  Death 
Under § 408(d)(3)(I), death may necessitate the waiver of a time 
requirement because the transition from the decedent to the executor of the 
decedent’s estate may significantly disrupt the taxpayer’s affairs.194  While the 
executor has a duty to step forward within a reasonable time to manage the 
affairs of the estate,195 the transition could cause the executor to miss an IRC 
deadline.  For example, as illustrated in Davis, value determinations of a 
                                                                                                                          
(C.D. Cal. 1994) (noting that the taxpayer, who suffered from dementia, overpaid close to $7,000 
that the IRS refused to refund because his estate filed the refund claim outside of the statute of 
limitations), rev’d, 67 F.3d 260 (9th Cir. 1995), rev’d, 519 U.S. 347 (1997), superseded by 
statute, Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206,  
§ 3202(a), 112 Stat. 685, 740–41 (codified at I.R.C. § 6511(h) (2006)). 
 191. See Webb, 66 F.3d at 692 (explaining that Mrs. Parsons was mentally incapacitated for 
fourteen years); Brockamp, 859 F. Supp. at 1284–85 (explaining that Mr. McGill was “‘mentally 
deranged’” from 1984 until his death in 1988). 
 192. See I.R.C. § 408(d)(3)(I) (2006) (no time frame for waiver of the sixty-day filing 
requirement). 
 193. I.R.C. § 6511(h) (2006). 
 194. Rev. Proc. 2003-16, 2003-4 I.R.B. 359 (listing death as an excusable circumstance for 
waiving the sixty-day requirement in § 408(d)(3)); INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 188 
(listing death as a basis for reasonable cause for a late filing or late payment penalty). 
 195. See I.R.C. § 6012(b)(1) (2006) (“If an individual is deceased, the return of such 
individual . . . shall be made by his executor, administrator, or other person charged with the 
property of such decedent.”). 
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decedent’s assets may be subject to litigation, thereby delaying the proceedings 
and causing the taxpayer’s estate to miss a filing deadline.196  The Code should 
acknowledge this possibility and accommodate the death of a taxpayer with a 
more flexible tolling provision. 
e.  Misleading Statements or Guidance from the IRS 
Equitable tolling is available in situations in which the government misled 
the taxpayer about the statutory deadline.197  Misleading information therefore 
should also be a basis for relief under § 6511(h).198  Congress recognized the 
potential for the IRS to mislead or provide incorrect information to taxpayers 
and, with the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act, required 
the IRS to specifically denote the last day on which a taxpayer can petition the 
Tax Court on statutory notices of deficiency.199  If the date on the note from 
the IRS is incorrect, the taxpayer is then permitted to file a petition within the 
time period promised by the incorrect notice.200  Similarly, the government 
                                                     
 196. Davis v. United States, No. 2:11-CV-00034, 2011 WL 6294467, at *1 (N.D. Miss. Dec. 
15, 2011). 
 197. See, e.g., Bailey v. West, 160 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (noting that if 
government misleads a claimant into missing a filing deadline, the claimant may be entitled to 
equitable tolling of the six-year statute of limitations to file a complaint in Court of Federal 
Claims); Juice Farms, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1344, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (recognizing that 
the court would equitably toll the six-year statute of limitations for filing a claim if the 
government tricked the plaintiff into missing filing deadline). 
 198. Treasury Regulation 301.6404-3 requires the abatement of “[a]ny portion of any penalty 
or addition to tax that is attributable to erroneous advice furnished to the taxpayer in writing by an 
officer or employee of the” IRS.  Treas. Reg. § 301.6404-3(a) (2012).  The IRS can also reduce a 
penalty for reasonable cause if the taxpayer relies on oral advice from an IRS employee.  
INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 188, at § 20.1.1.3.3.4.2. 
 199. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, 
§ 3463, 112 Stat. 685, 767 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 6213 (2006 & Supp. 2012)) (“Any petition 
filed with the Tax Court on or before the last date specified for filing such petition by the 
Secretary in the notice of deficiency shall be treated as timely filed.”). 
 200. INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 188, at § 35.3.2 (explaining that, “[e]ven if 
the date listed on the notice of deficiency for the last day to file is incorrect and allows more than 
the statutory 90 or 150 day period to timely file a petition, a petition mailed to the Tax Court on 
or before the date listed on the notice will nevertheless be deemed timely”).  Courts addressing 
the time frame to appeal a notice of deficiency originally considered the certified mailing record 
as the “true” date of the mailing to prevent the IRS from benefitting from its own mistake.  See, 
e.g., Lundy v. Comm’r, 73 T.C. (CCH) 1693, 1697 (1997).  The IRS subsequently required the 
taxpayer to appeal the notice within a period that began on the actual date the notice of 
delinquency was mailed.  I.R.S. Chief Couns. Mem. SCA 1998-036 (Dec. 4, 1998) (citing Hurst, 
Anthony & Watkins, 1 B.T.A. 26 (1924); United Tel. Co. v. Comm’r, 1 B.T.A. 450 (1925)) 
(“Generally, the time for filing a petition begins to run on the date of actual mailing, at least 
where the notice is undated or dated prior to the actual mailing date.”).  The IRS explained that, 
although “courts have fixed the date of actual mailing variously, . . . [i]t is now fairly settled that 
the relevant date is the postmark date, and that in the absence of the actual postmark, the best 
evidence is the certified mailing list.”  Id.  However, even after Congress amended § 6213 to 
require the notice of deficiency to bear the final date for appeal to the Tax Court, § 3463(b), 112 
Stat. at 767, the IRS could still record the incorrect date.  Consequently, the IRS adopted an 
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should provide a remedy in situations in which its own mistake causes a 
taxpayer to miss statutory deadlines. 
f.  Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
Allowing a breach of fiduciary duty to extend the period for performing a 
duty allows taxpayers who fall prey to unscrupulous fiduciaries to have 
additional time to seek the correct result.  The loss of a time frame for acting 
due to the actions of a fiduciary most frequently occurs with minors or the very 
old.  If a breach of fiduciary duty is an excusable circumstance under a broad 
grant of statutory relief, minors who fall victim to unscrupulous fiduciaries 
could have the opportunity to seek redress when they reach majority.  Often, a 
fiduciary who missed a filing deadline is unable to make the taxpayer, who 
lacks capacity, whole.201  Consequently, a broad grant of statutory relief should 
provide the injured taxpayer the opportunity to seek relief by tolling the statute 
of limitations in situations in which relief from the fiduciary does not exist.  
This provision does not seek to allow fiduciaries to escape liability and make 
the Government the insurer of the fiduciary’s bad action but rather to recognize 
that vulnerable individuals should not suffer unnecessarily as a result of actions 
beyond their control. 
g.  Domestic Abuse 
The IRS has acknowledged the special problems caused by domestic abuse 
by granting equitable relief under § 6015’s innocent spouse provision. 202  
Congress should consider the complications associated with domestic violence 
beyond § 6015(f) and recognize that domestic abuse could cause taxpayers to 
miss other deadlines within the IRC.203  These time frames should similarly be 
extended if taxpayers can show that domestic abuse caused the failure to 
timely act. 
                                                                                                                          
approach more favorable to the taxpayer.  See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 188, at 
§ 35.3.2. 
 201. See McGovern, supra note 80, at 863 (noting that, in situations in which a fiduciary 
“acts adversely,” the fiduciary cannot remedy the taxpayer because he cannot “assert[] a claim 
against himself”). 
 202. I.R.S. Notice 2012-8, 2012-4 I.R.B. 309 (expanding the IRS’s authority to grant 
equitable relief with regard to “abuse and financial control by the nonrequesting spouse”).  The 
IRS observed that “when a requesting spouse has been abused by the nonrequesting spouse,” 
under the existing innocent spouse provision, “the requesting spouse may not [be] able to 
challenge the treatment of any items on the joint return, question the payment of the taxes 
reported as due on the joint return, or challenge the nonrequesting spouse’s assurance regarding 
the payment of the taxes.”  Id. 
 203. See Mannella v. Comm’r, 631 F.3d 115, 117, 125 (3d Cir. 2011) (remanding the case so 
that the district court could determine whether the statute of limitations under § 6015 should be 
equitably tolled). 
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h.  Diligent Pursuit of Litigation 
Statutes of limitations should be tolled while litigation or administrative 
proceedings are pending if the taxpayer diligently pursued the judicial or 
administrative matters.  A taxpayer may be unable to file a refund claim or suit 
until a court has resolved an underlying issue, and the taxpayer may 
consequently miss a filing deadline.204  Congress has already provided relief to 
similarly situated habeas corpus petitioners and permitted tolling of the 
AEDPA’s statute of limitations for properly-filed petitions. 205   Taxpayers 
should receive similar relief tolling statutory time periods during certain 
judicial or administrative proceedings which prevent the taxpayer from timely 
action. 
2.  Standards for Testing Bases for Relief 
Both the IRS and the courts need reasonable and administrable standards for 
granting relief from statutory time frames.  The technical medical report 
required by Revenue Procedure 99-21 provides only one possible model for the 
standard of relief. 206   The quantifiable standard imposed by the Revenue 
Procedure aids the IRS in administering a provision that has the possibility of 
opening a Pandora’s Box of unfinished business.  However, the standard 
should not only be quantifiable, but also flexible enough to minimize the 
difficulty encountered by some worthy taxpayers in providing proof of 
financial disability. 
The medical report required by Revenue Procedure 99-21 places a heavy 
burden on the taxpayer to procure a satisfactory description of the disability 
from a physician.207  This standard precludes relief if the physician cannot 
describe the taxpayer’s condition in a sufficiently specific manner.208  Rather 
than focus on the specific language of the expert, whether it is a medical 
opinion or the circumstance of domestic violence, the standard should take an 
approach focused on gathering the facts and applying those facts to the basis 
for relief.  The IRS should not require the taxpayer to provide reports with 
                                                     
 204. See Davis v. United States, No. 2:11-CV-00034, 2011 WL 6294467 (N.D. Miss. Dec. 
15, 2011) (noting that the plaintiff failed to file a timely refund request because of the underlying 
litigation over the estate’s ownership interest in the property at issue); see also Haas v. United 
States, 107 Fed. Cl. 1, 3–5 (2012) (dismissing the taxpayer’s refund claim as untimely, despite his 
ongoing effort to obtain disability benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs). 
 205. Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010). 
 206. See Rev. Proc. 99-21, 1999-1 C.B. 960. 
 207. See id. (requiring “a description of the taxpayer’s physical or mental impairment”). 
 208. See id. (mandating that the statement include “[1] the physician’s medical opinion that 
the physical or mental impairment prevented the taxpayer from managing [his] financial affairs; 
[2] the physician’s medical opinion that the physical or mental impairment was or can be 
expected to result in death or that it has lasted (or can be expected to last) for a continuous period 
not less than 12 months; [and] [3] to the best of the physician’s knowledge, the specific time 
period during which the taxpayer was prevented by such physical or mental impairment from 
managing the taxpayer’s financial affairs”). 
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specific language, but should focus on what the taxpayer must prove and then 
evaluate the evidence to determine whether the circumstance is excusable.  The 
IRS should also specifically identify the proof necessary to establish an 
excusable circumstance.  The IRS should explain how the taxpayer can 
establish his claim and specifically detail what an expert report must contain. 
Both the cases that apply equitable tolling principles and Revenue Procedure 
2003-16  take a broader approach, foregoing Revenue Procedure 99-21’s 
narrow, check-the-box path to relief.209  Under this approach, the IRS and the 
reviewing court consider all of the surrounding circumstances and 
consequently have a greater opportunity to achieve a fair result. 
C.  Mechanism for Granting Relief 
Each of the IRC’s provisions has its own mechanisms for relief.  Section 
6511(h)’s process is problematic because it authorizes the IRS to grant relief 
without mandating disclosure of the decision.210  If the IRS receiving office or 
appeals office determines that a taxpayer meets the criteria of § 6511(h)—as 
elaborated in Revenue Procedure 99-21—then the IRS makes no official 
notification of the decision, other than to the taxpayer.211  The only cases that 
make their way into the public eye involve disputes between the IRS and 
taxpayers over the application of the relief provision.212  Most courts engaging 
in this review have given significant deference to Revenue Procedure 99-21 
and the IRS’s decision.213  Therefore, it is difficult to discern what set of 
circumstances meets § 6511(h)’s requirements and is entitled to a time 
extension. 
In creating a new mechanism for relief from statutory time frames Congress 
should consider the existing procedures, in addition to other review 
mechanisms for granting relief to taxpayers.  Revenue Procedure 99-21 created 
a system that operates within existing IRS claims review procedures.214  This 
                                                     
 209. Even one case interpreting Revenue Procedure 99-21 considered relief beyond the 
narrow language of the Procedure.  See Bowman v. IRS, No. CIV 5-09-0167 MCE GGH PS, 
2010 WL 2991712, at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 29, 2010) (holding that a technically deficient 
physician’s statement can be cured by supplemental statements that collectively comply 
with Revenue Procedure 99-21). 
 210. See generally I.R.C. § 6511 (2006) (containing no disclosure requirement). 
 211. See generally id.; Rev. Proc. 99-21, 1999-1 C.B. 960 (containing no disclosure 
requirement).  Cf. Rev. Proc. 2003-16, 2003-4 I.R.B. 359 (requiring a private letter ruling, which 
must be disclosed per I.R.C. § 6110(a) (2006)). 
 212. See, e.g., United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347 (1997) (resolving a dispute between 
a taxpayer and the IRS regarding the proper application of § 6511(h)), superseded by statute, 
Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 3202(a), 
112 Stat. 685, 740–41 (codified at I.R.C. § 6511(h) (2006)); Webb v. United States, 66 F.3d 691 
(4th Cir. 1995) (same); Scott v. United States, 847 F. Supp. 1499 (D. Haw. 1995) (same),  
aff’d, Nos. 94-15321, 94-15323, 1995 WL 653979, at *1–2 (9th Cir. Oct. 5, 1995). 
 213. See supra note 101 (citing cases in which courts have deferred to Revenue Procedure 
99-21). 
 214. See Rev. Proc. 99-21, 1999-1 C.B. 960. 
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system is advantageous because it relies on IRS officials who are familiar with 
refund claims.215  However, because of the system’s lack of transparency, it 
does not provide helpful information to other applicants about the likelihood of 
relief.216 
Section 408(d)(3)(I)’s private letter ruling process provides a transparent but 
arguably more cumbersome procedure.  Like Revenue Procedure 99-21’s 
financial disability requirements, requesting a private letter ruling is 
challenging for pro se taxpayers who may not fully understand the submission 
procedure.  However, a private letter ruling provides insight into the  
decision-making process and establishes precedent to guide subsequent 
taxpayers seeking similar relief.217  A transparent system helps to identify the 
circumstances under which taxpayers should seek relief. 
The IRS is not solely responsible for awarding relief under § 7508; rather, 
Congress, the President, or the Department of Defense determines whether an 
area qualifies as a combat zone and whether a taxpayer in that zone is entitled 
to relief.218  Although the IRS may have some discretion in evaluating the 
evidence the taxpayer presents, the procedure for granting relief is fairly 
transparent because of the public nature of naming a combat zone.219  The 
IRS’s role is one of verification, not of determination. 
Relief under § 7508A is similarly broad and transparent, providing relief 
publicly and to a wide spectrum of taxpayers. 220   The IRS’s role under  
§ 7508A is primarily one of determination, as Congress authorized the IRS to 
determine the scope of relief.221  Additionally, the IRS fills a verification role, 
ensuring that taxpayers meet the requirements for relief.222  Section § 7508A in 
many ways places the greatest burden on the IRS because of this dual role. 
Revenue Procedure 2003-16 establishes a private letter ruling process.223  
Since its inception, the process has produced a large number of decisions.224  
Private letter rulings are public, allowing taxpayers seeking relief to benefit 
                                                     
 215. See id. 
 216. See supra note 211 and accompanying text (noting that neither  § 6511 nor Revenue 
Procedure 99-21 requires the IRS to disclose its decisions). 
 217. See I.R.C. § 6110(a) (2006) (requiring the IRS to publish its private letter rulings). 
 218. I.R.C. § 7508(a) (2006). 
 219. See supra note 128 (listing congressional hearings discussing combat zones and public 
laws passed by Congress to declare combat zones). 
 220. See I.R.C. § 7508A(a) (2006 & Supp. 2012) (applying to any taxpayer the Secretary of 
the Treasury concludes has been “affected by a federally declared disaster”). 
 221. See id. (authorizing the IRS to award the amount of relief it determines to be 
appropriate, based on the “federally declared disaster” in question). 
 222. See id. (requiring the Secretary of the Treasury to determine whether the taxpayer is 
actually “affected by a federally declared disaster”). 
 223. Rev. Proc. 2003-16, 2003-4 I.R.B. 359. 
 224. See Dale F. Rubin, Private Letter and Revenue Rulings: Remedy or Ruse?, 28 N. KY. L. 
REV. 50, 51–52 (2001) (tracing the history of private letter rulings). 
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from the IRS’s previous decisions.225  The person seeking a private letter ruling 
must pay a fee, which assists the IRS in maintaining the system for the 
rulings.226  Such a fee could assist in limiting the number of persons seeking 
relief under the broader grant of relief from statutory time frames proposed 
herein.   However, any fee for seeking relief from statutory time frames must 
accommodate low-income taxpayers for whom the fee may serve as a barrier 
to relief.227 
Congress has created two less formal procedures that permit administrative 
appeals and authorize the Tax Court to review the IRS’s decisions: the 
innocent spouse provision and collection due process.228  These procedures, 
which both generally involved low-income taxpayers, could serve as models 
for a review mechanism for relief from statutory time frames.  The IRS could 
set up a special unit for processing relief requests based on the defined 
excusable circumstances and provide an administrative appeal of the initial 
determination, like the innocent spouse provisions.229  Alternatively, the IRS 
could authorize the special unit to make the initial determination regarding the 
request for relief, subject to appellate review like claims under collection due 
process.230  In either case, the IRS’s decision, if unfavorable to the taxpayer, 
could result in a ticket to Tax Court for a review of the determination.  For 
transparency, the IRS and the Tax Court could publish decisions, similar to 
publishing accepted offers-in-compromise. 231   Furthermore, the innocent 
                                                     
 225. See I.R.C. § 6110(a) (2006) (requiring the IRS to disclose written determinations). 
 226. See Rev. Proc. 2012-1, 2012-1 I.R.B. 1, Sec. 15 & Appx. A (listing private letter ruling 
fees). 
 227. Unlike requests for an offer in compromise, which has a full fee waiver for low-income 
taxpayers and arguably provides the collection equivalent of a private letter ruling, the private 
letter ruling process currently has no fee waiver provision.  See 26 C.F.R. § 300.3 (2013).  The 
current private letter ruling process contains formalities that may require adjustment to fit the 
needs of low-income taxpayers and applicants of the type of equitable process described here.  
See Rev. Proc. 2012-1, 2012-1 I.R.B. 1, Sec. 15 & Appx. A. 
 228. See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.  
105-206, § 3201, 112 Stat. 685, 734–40 (codified in scattered sections of I.R.C.) (adding innocent 
spouse relief); § 3401, 112 Stat. at 746–50 (codified at I.R.C. §§ 6320, 6330) (adding collection 
due process relief). 
 229. See generally INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 188, at § 4.11.34 (explaining 
the process of claiming innocent spouse relief). 
 230. See generally INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 188, at § 5.1.9 (explaining the 
collection appeal process). 
For collection due process cases, one centralized site does not exist; the correspondence giving 
the taxpayer the appeals rights informs the taxpayer of the location to which to send the collection 
due process request for appeal.  Id. 
 231. See I.R.C. § 6103(k)(1) (2006) (providing for public inspection of certain  
offers-in-compromise); Treas. Reg. § 601.702(d)(8) (2010) (requiring that “form 7249, ‘Offer 
Acceptance Report,’ for each accepted offer in compromise with respect to any liability for a tax 
imposed by title 26 shall be made available for inspection and copying”); INTERNAL REVENUE 
MANUAL, supra note 188, at § 11.3.11.8 (“Public Inspection of Accepted  
Offers-in-Compromise”).  Applicable Forms 7249 will be available for one year from the date of 
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spouse and collection due process procedures are simpler than obtaining a 
private letter ruling, which is beneficial to all taxpayers, and especially  
low-income taxpayers. 
The statutory relief provision should adopt a review process that 
incorporates the benefits of the innocent spouse provisions, collection due 
process, and the private letter ruling process: the taxpayer should first have the 
opportunity for administrative appeal, followed by the opportunity for review 
of the decision by the Tax Court for abuse of discretion.  The IRS should 
publish its decisions with an online system to provide guidance to similarly 
situated taxpayers.  Additionally, taxpayers seeking review should pay a fee for 
system maintenance.232  The fee would be waived for qualifying low-income 
taxpayers. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Congress has expressed concern for individuals and entities that miss 
deadlines under the IRC.  Yet, it has only provided relief in limited 
circumstances.  More than twenty years have passed since the Supreme Court 
held that equitable tolling principles apply to federal statutes.  Perhaps it was 
an unlucky stroke of timing that the first IRC provision litigated after Irwin 
was § 6511 with its many rules.  The goal of extending equitable tolling to the 
Code cannot be achieved without a stronger statement by the Supreme Court 
concerning the exceptional nature of tax laws.  Without broad legislation 
providing guidance in this area, taxpayers will be forced to attempt to extend 
equitable tolling to tax cases with piecemeal litigation. 
Given its acknowledgement of the role of equitable circumstances in certain, 
so far limited, situations, Congress should preempt this unnecessary litigation 
and set broad parameters for the extension of the IRC’s deadlines for good 
cause.  By adding a broad provision to the Internal Revenue Code, Congress 
could control the discussion on its own terms, moving away from the narrow, 
case-specific relief available under § 6511(h) to the broader type of equitable 
relief perhaps envisioned by Treasury Secretary Rubin.  This type of relief 
would only award relief to deserving taxpayers who succeed on the merits, 
which in turn would promote fairness in the tax system and overall 
compliance.  By creating a broader system of relief that is not dependent on 
equitable tolling principles or subject to stiff administrative barriers, Congress 
                                                                                                                          
execution, and the file will be maintained so that it is readily available for examination by the 
public. See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 188, at § 5.8.8.9; see also Treas. Reg. § 
301.7122-1 (2012) (providing guidance for offers-in-compromise matters); Treas. Reg. § 
601.702(d) (2010) (same). 
 232. The authors recommend charging a fee of $1,000 or more to reflect the cost to the IRS.  
It is possible to consider returning this fee to taxpayers whose determinations are favorable.  
Although this fee would put the IRS in a position in which it could be accused of preventing a 
favorable determination in order to keep the fee, the IRS would not make its decisions on such a 
basis and credible accusations of that type behavior would be extremely rare. 
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could craft a system that serves all taxpayers, not just those with funds to 
purchase the full measure of justice. 
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